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In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security
protocols in the presence of passive adversaries. In contrast to other works, we do not
consider a ﬁxed set of primitives but aim at results for arbitrary equational theories. We
deﬁnea framework for comparingacryptographic implementationand its idealizationwith
respect to various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational
soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present
a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufﬁcient but also necessary.
Finally, to illustrate our framework, we establish the soundness of static equivalence for
the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Today’s ubiquity of computer networks increases the need for theoretic foundations for cryptographic protocols. For
more than 20 years now, two communities separately developed two families of models. Both views have been very useful
in increasing the understanding and quality of security protocol design. On the one hand formal or logicalmodels have been
developed, based on the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [2]. Thesemodels view cryptographic operations in a rather abstract
and idealizedway. On the other hand cryptographic or computationalmodels [3] are closer to implementations: cryptographic
operations are modeled as algorithmsmanipulating bit-strings. Those models cover a large class of attacks, namely all those
implementable by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
Theadvantageof formalmodels is that securityproofsaregenerally simplerandsuitable forautomaticprocedures, even for
complex protocols. Unfortunately, the high degree of abstraction and the limited adversary power raise questions regarding
the security offered by such proofs. Potentially, justifying symbolic proofs with respect to standard computational models
has tremendous beneﬁts: protocols can be analyzed using automated tools and still beneﬁt from the security guarantees of
the computational model.
For the past few years, a signiﬁcant research effort has been directed at linking these two approaches. In their seminal
work [4], Abadi and Rogaway prove the computational soundness of formal (symmetric) encryption in the case a passive
attacker. Since then, many results have been obtained. Each of these results considers a ﬁxed set of primitives, for instance
symmetric or public-key encryption. In this paper, we aim at presenting general results for arbitrary equational theories,
such as encryption, but also less studied ones, such as groups or exclusive OR. The interest of our approach is not only to
develop a general and uniﬁed framework for the treatment of cryptographic primitives. Conceptually, it also offers a better
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understanding of the use of equational theories whenmodeling the algebraic properties of the primitives. Indeed, for several
years, formal models have considered equational theories like the theory of exclusive OR, abelian groups or homomorphic
encryption (for a survey on algebraic properties see for instance [5,6]) in order to model some cryptographic aspects. But it
is a priori unclear whether “enough” equations have been considered to provide realistic security guarantees. A real attacker
might still exploit additional properties of a cryptographic primitive that have not beenmodeled. Here, we propose a setting
and some proof techniques that allow us to formally deﬁne and prove that “enough” equations have been considered.
We concentrate on static equivalence, a now standard notion originating from the applied pi calculus [7]. Intuitively, static
equivalence asks whether an attacker can distinguish between two tuples of messages—later called frames—by exhibiting
a relation which holds on one tuple but not on the other. Static equivalence provides an elegant means to express security
properties on pieces of data, for instance those observed by a passive attacker during the run of a protocol. In the context
of active attackers, static equivalence has also been used to characterize process equivalences [7] and off-line guessing
attacks [8,9]. There now exist exact [10] and approximate [11] algorithms to decide static equivalence for a large family of
equational theories.
Our ﬁrst contribution is a general framework for comparing formal and computationalmodels in the presence of a passive
attacker.Wedeﬁne thenotionsof soundness and faithfulnessof a cryptographic implementationwith respect to equality, static
equivalence and (non-)deducibility. Soundness holds when a formal notion of security has a computational interpretation.
For instance, statically equivalent tuples of messages (frames) should be computationally indistinguishable. Conversely,
faithfulnessholdswhenevery formalattackonagivennotionof securitycanbemappedtoanefﬁcient computational attacker.
As an illustration, we consider an equational theory modeling abelian groups with exponents taken over a commutative
ring. We show that the soundness of static equivalence implies the hardness of several classical problems in cryptography,
notably the decisional Difﬁe–Hellmann and the RSA problem. Although not completely surprising, this results illustrate well
the expressive power of static equivalence deﬁned over tailored equational theories.
Our second contribution is a sufﬁcient criterion for soundness with respect to static equivalence: intuitively the usual
computational semantics of terms has to be indistinguishable to an idealized one. We also deﬁne and study a useful class of
frames, called transparent frames, for arbitrary equational theories. Informally, a frame is transparent if every secret in use
is deducible from the frame itself. Transparent frames enjoy notable properties such as a simple characterization of static
equivalence and—in the case of uniformdistributions—the fact that two statically equivalent transparent frames always yield
the same concrete distribution, that is, are indistinguishable in the sense of information theory. This study of transparent
frames allows us to exhibit a class of equational theories for which our soundness criterion is necessary.
Our third contribution consists in applying our framework to obtain two ﬁrst soundness results for static equivalence. The
ﬁrst equational theory that we consider deals with the exclusive OR. This simple but important primitive has been largely
used in cryptographic constructions such as the One-Time Pad and in protocols (see [6] for examples). Interestingly, our
proof of soundness reﬂects the unconditional security (in the information-theoretic sense) of the One-Time Pad [12]. Second
we consider a theory of symmetric encryption and lists. The result is similar in spirit to the one of Abadi and Rogaway [4].
However, we consider deterministic, length-preserving, symmetric encryption schemes—also known as pseudo-random
permutations or ciphers, while Abadi and Rogaway consider probabilistic, symmetric encryption. This choice is motivated
by famous examples of ciphers such as DES or AES. In both examples, the speciﬁcity of our work is to prove the soundness
of a standard formal notion, static equivalence, rather than that of a specialized relation.
Related work. The study of the link between the formal and the computational approaches for cryptographic protocols
started with the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway [4], in a passive setting. There have been many extensions to the work
of Abadi and Rogaway in the passive case, such as studying completeness [13], considering deterministic encryption [14] (a
more detailed comparison is provided below), One-Time Pad, length-revealing and same-key revealing encryption [12] or
allowing composed keys [15] and key-cycles [16].
The ﬁrst results in an active setting were achieved by Backes et al. [17–19]. These works prove the soundness of a
rich language including digital signatures, public-key and symmetric key encryption in the presence of an active attacker
for several kind of security properties. Quite similar results were established in more abstract and classical Dolev–Yao
models for asymmetric encryption and signatures [20,21]. While more easily amendable to full automation, these results
do not offer universal composability guarantees like the previous ones. However, Canetti and Herzog [22] have recently
obtained a similar soundness theorem for a restricted class of protocols—mutual authentication and key exchange proto-
cols using only public-key encryption—which does offer strong composability properties in the universal composability
framework. Laud [23] presents an automated procedure for computationally sound proofs of conﬁdentiality in the case
of an active attacker and symmetric encryption when the number of sessions is bounded. Datta et al. [24] introduce a
symbolic logic that allows cryptographically sound security proof. Recently, Blanchet [25] proposed a computationally sound
mechanized prover that relies directly on games transformations, a proof technique commonly used in the cryptographic
setting.
Except [25], the previously mentioned results are all dedicated to some ﬁxed set of cryptographic primitives. Here, our
goal is not restricted to obtaining some particular soundness result for a given set of primitives and security properties.
Rather, we aim at developing a general setting to reason about the adequacy of abstract functional symbols equipped with
an equational theory and their corresponding cryptographic implementations. To the best of our knowledge, this approach
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is new and distinct from existing work. We now discuss some related work concerning the two theories (exclusive OR as
well as ciphers and lists) that we have considered to illustrate our framework.
Regarding the soundness of exclusive OR, Backes and Pﬁtzmann [26] have independently shown an impossibility result in
the framework of reactive simulatability, in the presence of an active adversary. They also present a soundness result in the
presence of a passive adversary. While we consider the application of exclusive OR only to pure random values, Backes and
Pﬁtzmann deal with arbitrary payloads. It is however not clear how the framework of reactive simulatability in the presence
of a passive adversary compares to our framework based on static equivalence.
Concerning the theory of ciphers and list, Laud [14] presents soundness results in the style of Abadi and Rogaway for
ciphers. While these results are close to ours, Laud’s notion of formal equivalence is apparently more pessimistic than ours
regarding the secrecy of encryption keys. For instance, as opposed to [14], we consider that the encryption of a fresh random
value by a known key is indistinguishable from a random value—that is, formally, the pair (enc(n, k), k) is indistinguishable
from (n′, k). The reason is that, in the absence of tags, each encryption key of a cipher yields a permutation on the space
of values. Therefore, if n follows the uniform distribution, such as in our implementation (Section 5.2), so does the term
enc(n, k). Provided a suitable set of equations, static equivalence naturally accounts for this property, whereas there seems
to be no natural and immediate way to express the same equivalences using patterns in the style of Abadi and Rogaway. In
some sense, thework of Abadi andWarinschi [27] can be seen as an attempt to do so on a fragment of equivalencesmodeling
guessing attacks. Recently, the techniques developed in the present paper have been applied successfully by Abadi et al. [28]
to generalize the ideas of [27] and justify a modeling of guessing attacks purely based on static equivalence.
In [14], Laud provides a computationally sound proof system handling both ciphers and exclusive OR in the presence of
a passive attacker. This proof system is used to prove the security of several encryption modes including CBC. This approach
differs from the one developed here as it aims at direct cryptographic proofs of security (much as in [23,25]). In comparison,
our approach (as in [4,12,15–21]) aims to exhibit a class of protocols for which the absence of formal attacks entails the
existence of a computational proof of security.
Further related work. Since the publication of a preliminary version [1] of this article, several papers have addressed the
computational soundness of static equivalence. As already mentioned, Abadi et al. [28] study resistance against ofﬂine
guessing attacks modelled in terms of static equivalence and use the framework developed in this paper to show the
soundness of an equational theory including ciphers, symmetric and asymmetric encryption. In [29], Bana et al. argue
that the notion of static equivalence is too coarse and not sound for many interesting equational theories. They introduce
a general notion of formal indistinguishability relation. This highlights that soundness of static equivalence only holds for
a restricted set of well-formed frames (in the same vein Abadi and Rogaway used restrictions to forbid key cycles). They
illustrate the unsoundness of static equivalence for modular exponentiation. More recently, Kremer andMazaré [30] use our
framework to deﬁne soundness of static equivalence in the presence of an adaptive, rather than purely passive, adversary.
They show soundness results of static equivalence for an equational theory modelling modular exponentiation (for a class
of well-formed frames, hence not contradicting [29]), as well as symmetric encryption with composed keys which can be
computed using modular exponentiation or exclusive or.
The active version of static equivalence is the observational equivalence relation introduced by Milner and Hoare in the
early 1980s. Intuitively, two processes are equivalent if an observer cannot tell the difference between the two processes. The
observer can in particular intercept and sendmessages to the processes. Comon-Lundh and Cortier [31] have recently shown
that observational equivalence between processes in a fragment of the applied pi-calculus [32] implies cryptographic indis-
tinguishability against active attackers, in the context of symmetric encryption. They use an extended version of soundness
of static equivalence (called tree soundness) as a key step in their proof.
Outline of the paper. In the next section, we introduce our abstract and concretemodels together with the notions of indistin-
guishability. We then deﬁne the notions of soundness and faithfulness and illustrate some consequences of soundness with
respect to static equivalence on groups. In Section 4, we deﬁne the ideal semantics of abstract terms, present our soundness
criterion, andprove it necessary for a large family of equational theories. As an illustration (Section5),weprove the soundness
for the theories modeling exclusive OR, as well as ciphers and lists. We then conclude in Section 6. An appendix contains
detailed proofs of formal lemmas related to static equivalence.
2. Modeling cryptographic primitives with abstract algebras
In this section we introduce some notations and set our abstract and concrete models.
2.1. Abstract algebras
Our abstract models—called abstract algebras—consist of term algebras deﬁned over a many-sorted ﬁrst-order signature
and equipped with equational theories.
Speciﬁcally, a signature (S,F) is made of a set of sortsS, with elements denoted by s, s1, . . . , and a setF of symbols,
written f , f1, . . . , together with arities of the form ar(f ) = s1 × . . . × sk → s (k  0). Symbols that take k = 0 arguments are
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called constants; their arity is simply written s. We ﬁx a setN of names, written a, b, . . . , and a setX of variables x, y, . . . We
assume that names and variables are given with sorts, and that an inﬁnite number of names and variables are available for
each sort. The set of terms of sort s is deﬁned inductively by
T ::= term of sort s
| x variable x of sort s
| a name a of sort s
| f (T1, . . . , Tk) application of symbol f ∈F
where for the last case, we further require that Ti is a term of some sort si and ar(f ) = s1 × . . . × sk → s. We write var(T) and
names(T) for the set of variables and names occurring in T , respectively. A term T is ground or closed iff var(T) = ∅. We may
write var(T1, . . . , Tk) instead of var({T1, . . . , Tk}) and similarly for names.
A context C is a term with holes, or (more formally) a term with distinguished variables. When C is a context with n
distinguished variables x1, . . . , xn, we may write C[x1, . . . , xn] instead of C in order to show the variables, and when T1, . . . ,
Tn are terms we may also write C[T1, . . . , Tn] for the result of replacing each variable xi with the corresponding term Ti.
Substitutions are written σ = {x1 → T1, . . . , xn → Tn} with domain dom(σ ) = {x1, . . . , xn}. We only consider well-sorted
substitutions, that is, substitutions σ = {x1 → T1, . . . , xn → Tn} for which xi and Ti have the same sort. Such a σ is closed iff
all of the Ti are closed. We let var(σ ) =
⋃
i var(Ti), names(σ ) =
⋃
i names(Ti), and extend the notations var(.) and names(.)
to tuples and sets of terms and substitutions in the obvious way. The application of a substitution σ to a term T is written
σ(T) = Tσ . If p is a position of T , the expression T |p denotes the subterm of T at the position p. The expression T [T ′]p denotes
the term obtained after replacing the subterm in position p of T with T ′.
Symbols inF are intended to model cryptographic primitives, whereas names inN are used to model secrets, that
is, concretely random numbers. The intended behavior of the primitives is described by an equational theory E, that is, an
equivalence relation on terms (also written =E) compatible with applications of symbols and well-sorted substitutions:
• for every k-ary symbol f and terms t1, . . . , tk , t′1, . . . , t′k of the appropriate sorts, ∀i, ti =E t′i implies that f (t1, . . . , fk) =E
f (t′
1
, . . . , f ′
k
);
• for every well-sorted substitution σ and terms t, t′, if t =E t′ then tσ =E t′σ .
In the sequel we further require that E is stable under (well-sorted) substitution of names. All the equational theories
that we consider in this paper satisfy these properties. For instance, symmetric and deterministic encryption is modeled by
the theory Eenc generated by the classical equation Eenc = {dec(enc(x, y), y) = x}.
A symbol f is freewith respect to an equational theory E iff there exists a set of equations F generating E such that f does
not occur in F . A sort s is degenerated in E iff all terms of sort s are equal modulo E.
It is often useful to orient equations and work with rewriting rules instead of the equational theory. Formally, a rewriting
rule is an expression l → r where l and r are two terms of the same sort. Given a set of rewriting rulesR (called rewriting
system), we write T →R T ′ if there exists a rule l → r ∈R, a position p and a (well-sorted) substitution σ such that T |p = lσ
and T ′ = T [rσ ]p.Wewrite→∗R for the reﬂexive and transitive closure of→R, and=R for its reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive
closure.
Givenanequational theoryE andarewritingsystemR,wewrite→R/E for the relation=E→R=E .Wedeﬁne→∗R/E and=R/E
similarly as above.R is E-terminating iff →R/E admits no inﬁnite sequence of reductions T0 →R/E T1 →R/E . . . Tn →R/E . . .
It is E-conﬂuent iff for every T →∗R/E T1 and T →∗R/E T2, there exist T ′1 and T ′2 such that T1 →∗R/E T ′1, T2 →∗R/E T ′2, and T ′1 =E T ′2.
Finally,R is E-convergent iff it is both E-terminating and E-conﬂuent. When E is the syntactic equality, this yields the usual
notions of termination, conﬂuence and convergence.
2.2. Frames, deducibility and static equivalence
We use frames [7,10] to represent sequences of messages observed by an attacker, for instance during the execution of
a protocol. Formally, a (closed) frame is an expression ϕ = νa˜.{x1 = T1, . . . , xn = Tn} where a˜ is a set of bound (or restricted)
names, and for each i, Ti is a closed term of the same sort as xi.
For simplicity, we only consider (closed) frames ϕ = νa˜.{x1 = T1, . . . , xn = Tn}which restrict every name in use, that is, for
which a˜ = names(T1, . . . , Tn). A name a may still be disclosed explicitly by adding a mapping xa = a to the frame. Thus we
tend to assimilate such frames ϕ to their underlying substitutions σ = {x1 → T1, . . . , xn → Tn}.
Deﬁnition 1 (Deducibility). A (closed) term T is deducible from a frame ϕ in an equational theory E, written ϕ E T , iff there
exists a termM such that var(M) ⊆ dom(ϕ), names(M) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅, andMϕ =E T .
In what follows, again for simplicity, we only consider deducibility problems ϕ E T such that names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ).
Consider for instance the theory Eenc and the frame ϕ1 = νk1, k2, k3, k4. {x1 = enc(k1, k2), x2 = enc(k4, k3), x3 = k3}: the
name k4 is deducible from ϕ1 since dec(x2, x3)ϕ1 =Eenc k4 but neither k1 nor k2 are deducible.
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Deducibility is not always sufﬁcient to account for the knowledge of an attacker. For instance, it lacks partial information
on secrets. Indeed, if we consider a naive vote protocol where agents simply send their vote (0 or 1) encrypted under some
key, the security problem is not whether an attacker can learn the values of 0 or 1, but rather whether an attacker can tell the
difference between a message that contains the vote 0 and a message that contains the vote 1. That is why another classical
notion in formal methods is static equivalence.
Deﬁnition 2 (Static equivalence). Two frames ϕ1 and ϕ2 are statically equivalent in a theory E, written ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2, iff dom(ϕ1) =
dom(ϕ2), and for all termsM and N such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ1) and names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ1,ϕ2) = ∅,Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1 if and
only ifMϕ2 =E Nϕ2.
For instance, the two frames νk. {x = enc(0, k)}and νk. {x = enc(1, k)}are statically equivalentwith respect toEenc.However
the two frames
νk.{x = enc(0, k), y = k} and νk.{x = enc(1, k), y = k}
are not (consider the test dec(x, y) ?=0), although the set of terms that can be deduced from both frames is the same (0 and 1
are two constants known by the attacker).
2.3. Concrete semantics
We now give terms and frames a concrete semantics, parameterized by an implementation of the primitives. Provided a
set of sortsS and a set of symbolsF as above, a (S,F)-computational algebra A consists of
• a non-empty set of bit-strings [[s]]A ⊆ {0, 1}∗ for each sort s ∈S;
• an effective procedure implementing a function [[f ]]A : [[s1]]A × . . . × [[sk]]A → [[s]]A for each symbol f ∈F with ar(f ) =
s1 × . . . × sk → s;
• an effective procedure for deciding a congruence=A,s for each sort s, in order to check the equality of elements in [[s]]A (the
same element may be represented by different bit-strings); by congruence, we mean a reﬂexive, symmetric, transitive
relation such that e1 =A,s1 e′1, . . . , ek =A,sk e′k ⇒ [[f ]]A(e1, . . . , ek) =A,s [[f ]]A(e′1, . . . , e′k) (in the remainingwe often omit s and
write =A for =A,s);
• an effective procedure to draw random elements from [[s]]A; we denote such a drawing by x R←− [[s]]A; the drawing may
not follow a uniform distribution, but no =A,s-equivalence class should have probability 0.
Assume a ﬁxed (S,F)-computational algebra A. We associate to each (closed) frame ϕ = {x1 = T1, . . . , xn = Tn} a distri-
bution ψ = [[ϕ]]A, of which the drawings ψ̂ R←− ψ are computed as follows:
1. for each name a of sort s appearing in T1, . . . , Tn, draw a value â
R←− [[s]]A;
2. for each xi (1 i  n) of sort si, compute T̂i ∈ [[si]]A recursively on the structure of terms: ̂f (T ′1, . . . , T ′m) = [[f ]]A(T̂ ′1, . . . , T̂ ′m);
using the values â deﬁned at step 1 for names;
3. return the value ψ̂ = {x1 = T̂1, . . . , xn = T̂n}.
Such values φ = {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} with ei ∈ [[si]]A are called concrete frames. We extend the notation [[.]]A to tuples of
closed terms in the natural way: e1, . . . , en
R←− [[T1, . . . , Tn]]A denotes the drawing
{x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} R←− [[{x1 = T1, . . . , xn = Tn}]]A
for appropriate variables x1, . . . , xn. We also generalize the notation to (tuples of) terms with variables, by specifying a
concrete value for each of them: [[.]]A,{x1=e1,... ,xn=en}. Notice that when a term or a frame contains no names, the translation is
deterministic; in this case, we use the same notation to denote the distribution and its unique value.
In the rest of the paper we focus on asymptotic notions of cryptographic security and consider families of computational
algebra (Aη) indexed by a complexity parameter η  0. (This parameter η might be thought as the size of keys and other
secret values.) The concrete semantics of a frame ϕ is a family of distributions over concrete frames ([[ϕ]]Aη ). We only consider
families of computational algebras (Aη) such that the algebraic operations (i.e. the functions associated to symbols, the
congruence relation=A,s, and thedrawing functions) are computable byuniform, probabilistic polynomial-timealgorithms in
the complexity parameter η. This ensures that the concrete semantics of every (ﬁxed) term or frame is efﬁciently computable
(in the same sense).
Families of distributions (ensembles) over concrete frames beneﬁt from the usual notion of cryptographic indistinguisha-
bility. Intuitively, two families of distributions (ψη) and (ψ
′
η) are indistinguishable, written (ψη) ≈ (ψ ′η), iff no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaryA can guess whether he is given a sample from ψη or ψ ′η with a probability signiﬁcantly greater
than 1
2
. Formally, we ask the advantage ofA,
AdvIND(A, η,ψη ,ψ ′η) = P
[
ψ̂
R←− ψη : A(η, ψ̂) = 1
]
− P
[
ψ̂
R←− ψ ′η : A(η, ψ̂) = 1
]
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to be a negligible function of η. We recall that a function f is said negligible if for any integer n > 0, there exists η0 such that
f (η) η−n for any η  η0. (Note that we regard negative functions as negligible here.)
A function f (η) is overwhelming iff 1− f (η) is negligible. A family of distributions (ψη) is collision-free (with respect to the
family of congruences =Aη ) iff the probability of collision between two random elements from ψη , that is,
P
[
e1, e2
R←− ψη : e1 =Aη e2
]
, is a negligible function of η. Note that, by classical properties of probability, this is equiva-
lent to requiring that the probability of sampling any given e0 from ψη (modulo =Aη ) is negligible, that is, the function
supe0 P
[
e
R←− ψη : e =Aη e0
]
is bounded by a negligible function of η.
By convention, the adversaries considered in this paper are given access implicitly to the complexity parameter η and to
as many fresh random coins as needed.
3. Comparing abstract and computational algebras
In the previous section we have deﬁned abstract and computational algebras. We now relate formal notions such as
equality, (non-)deducibility and static equivalence to their computational counterparts, that is, equality, one-wayness and
indistinguishability.
3.1. Soundness and faithfulness
We introduce the notions of sound and faithful computational algebras with respect to the formal relations studied here:
equality, static equivalence and deducibility.
Let E be an equational theory. A family of computational algebras (Aη) is
• =E-sound iff for every closed terms T1, T2 of the same sort, T1 =E T2 implies that P
[
e1, e2
R←− [[T1, T2]]Aη : e1 =Aη e2
]
is
overwhelming;
• =E-faithful iff for every closed terms T1, T2 of the same sort, T1 /=E T2 implies that P
[
e1, e2
R←− [[T1, T2]]Aη : e1 =Aη e2
]
is
negligible;
• ≈E-sound iff for every frames ϕ1,ϕ2 with the same domain, ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2 implies that ([[ϕ1]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ2]]Aη );
• ≈E-faithful iff for every frames ϕ1,ϕ2 of the same domain, ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2 implies that there exists a polynomial-time adversary
A for distinguishing concrete frames, such that AdvIND(A, η, [[ϕ1]]Aη , [[ϕ2]]Aη ) is overwhelming;
• E-sound iff for every frame ϕ and closed term T such that names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ), ϕ E T implies that for each polynomial-
time adversaryA, P
[
φ, e
R←− [[ϕ, T ]]Aη : A(φ) =Aη e
]
is negligible;
• E-faithful iff for every frame ϕ and closed term T such that names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ), ϕ E T implies that there exists a
polynomial-time adversaryA such that P
[
φ, e
R←− [[ϕ, T ]]Aη : A(φ) =Aη e
]
is overwhelming.
Sometimes, it is possible to prove stronger notions of soundness that holdwithout restriction on the computational power
of adversaries. In particular, (Aη) is
• unconditionally =E-sound iff for every closed terms T1, T2 of the same sort, T1 =E T2 implies that
P
[
e1, e2
R←− [[T1, T2]]Aη : e1 =Aη e2
]
= 1;
• unconditionally ≈E-sound iff for every frames ϕ1,ϕ2 with the same domain, ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2 implies ([[ϕ1]]Aη ) = ([[ϕ2]]Aη );
• unconditionally E-sound iff for every frame ϕ and closed term T such that names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ) and ϕ E T , the drawings
for ϕ and T are independent: for all φ0, e0, P
[
φ0, e0
R←− [[ϕ, T ]]Aη
]
= P
[
φ0
R←− [[ϕ]]Aη
]
× P
[
e0
R←− [[T ]]Aη
]
, and the drawing
(
R←− [[T ]]Aη ) is collision-free.
The fact that the ﬁrst two unconditional notions are stronger than their computational counterparts is clear from the
deﬁnitions. As for the unconditional E-soundness, observe that if the drawings for ϕ and T are independent, and the
drawing (
R←− [[T ]]Aη ) is collision-free, then any adversaryA has negligible probability of retrieving the value of T:
P
[
φ, e
R←− [[ϕ, T ]]Aη : A(φ) =Aη e
]
= P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ]]Aη , e
R←− [[T ]]Aη : A(φ) =Aη e
]
 sup
e0
P
[
e
R←− [[T ]]Aη : e =Aη e0
]
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Generally, (unconditional) =E-soundness is given by construction. Indeed true formal equations correspond to the ex-
pected behavior of primitives and should hold in the concrete world with overwhelming probability. The other criteria are
however more difﬁcult to fulﬁll. Therefore it is often interesting to restrict frames to well-formed ones in order to achieve
soundness or faithfulness: for instance Abadi and Rogaway [4] do forbid encryption cycles (see Section 5.2).
It is worth noting that the notions of soundness and faithfulness introduced above are not independent.
Proposition 1. Let (Aη) be a =E-sound family of computational algebras. Then
1. (Aη) is E-faithful;
2. if (Aη) is also =E-faithful, (Aη) is ≈E-faithful.
Proof.
1. Supposenames(T) ⊆ names(ϕ) andϕ E T , that is, there existsM such that var(M) ⊆ dom(ϕ), names(M) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅,
andMϕ =E T . We deﬁne an adversaryAwhich can deduce [[T ]] from [[ϕ]] as follows: given the concrete frame φ = {xi =
ei},A returns a sample e R←− [[M]]Aη ,φ . As (Aη)η0 is =E-sound and names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ),A’s probability of success is
greater than 1 minus a negligible function.
2. Suppose ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2: there exist two termsM andN such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ1), names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ1,ϕ2) = ∅, and
for instance Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1 whereas Mϕ2 =E Nϕ2. LetA be the adversary that tests, given η and φ, whether [[M]]Aη ,φ =Aη
[[N]]Aη ,φ , and returns the result of the test.A runs in polynomial-time and by =E-soundness and =E-faithfulness, its
advantage is 1 minus a negligible function. 
Formany theories,wehave that≈E-soundness implies all theothernotionsof soundness and faithfulness. This emphasizes
the importance of ≈E-soundness and provides an additional motivation for its study. As an illustration, let us consider an
arbitrary theory which includes keyed hash functions.
Proposition 2. Let (Aη) be a family of ≈E-sound computational algebras. Assume that free binary symbols hs : s× Key → Hash
are available for every sort s, where the sort Key is not degenerated in E, and the drawing of random elements for the sort
Hash, (
R←− [[Hash]]Aη ), is collision-free. Then
1. (Aη) is =E-faithful.
2. (Aη) is E-sound.
3. Assume the implementations for the symbols hs are collision-resistant, that is, assume that for all T1, T2 of sort s, given a fresh
name k of sort Key, the quantity
P
[
e1, e2, e
′
1, e
′
2
R←− [[T1, T2, hs(T1, k), hs(T2, k)]]Aη : e1 =Aη e2, e′1 =Aη e′2
]
is negligible. Then (Aη) is =E-sound, E-faithful and ≈E-faithful.
Proof.
1. Let T1, T2 be two terms of sort s such that T1 /=E T2. Consider the frame ϕ = {x1 = hs(T1, k), x2 = hs(T2, k)} where k is a
fresh name of sort Key. As T1 /=E T2 and hs is free, we have ϕ ≈E {x1 = n, x2 = n′}where n,n′ are two distinct fresh names
of sort Hash (Proposition 17 of Appendix A). By assumption, this entails [[ϕ]] ≈ [[{x1 = n, x2 = n′}]]. In particular, since
(
R←− [[Hash]]Aη ) is collision-free, the quantity
P
[
e1, e2
R←− [[T1, T2]]Aη : e1 =Aη e2
]
 P
[
e′1, e
′
2
R←− [[hs(T1, k), hs(T2, k)]]Aη : e′1 =Aη e′2
]
is negligible.
2. Let ϕ be a frame and T a closed termof sort s such that names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ) and ϕ E T .We let ϕ0 = ϕ ∪ {x = hs(T , k), y =
k} and ϕ1 = ϕ ∪ {x = n, y = k} where x, y are fresh variables, k is a fresh name of sort Key, n is a fresh name of sort Hash.
As ϕ E T , we have ϕ0 ≈E ϕ1 (Proposition 18 of Appendix A). Thus by assumption, [[ϕ0]] ≈ [[ϕ1]].
By contradiction, suppose that there exists a polynomial-time adversaryA able to deduce [[T ]] from [[ϕ]] concretelywith
non-negligible probability of success. We build an adversary B that distinguishes between [[ϕ0]] and [[ϕ1]] as follows:
let φ be the sample from [[ϕb]]η to be analyzed, where b ∈ {0, 1}. Let T̂ be the answer ofAwhen given the restriction of
φ to dom(ϕ).B returns 0 if xφ =Aη [[hs]]Aη (̂T , yφ), and 1 otherwise. By deﬁnition, the advantage ofB is
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P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ0]]η : B(η,φ) = 0
]
− P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ1]]η : B(η,φ) = 0
]
= P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ0]]η; T̂ R←−A(φ|dom(ϕ)) : xφ =Aη [[hs]]Aη (̂T , yφ)
]
− P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ1]]η; T̂ R←−A(φ|dom(ϕ)) : xφ =Aη [[hs]]Aη (̂T , yφ)
]
 P
[
φ, e
R←− [[ϕ0, T ]]η; T̂ R←−A(φ|dom(ϕ)) : T̂ = e)
]
− P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ1]]η; T̂ R←−A(φ|dom(ϕ)) : xφ =Aη [[hs]]Aη (̂T , yφ)
]
In the last probability expression, observe that xφ is drawn from the distribution (
R←− [[Hash]]Aη ) independently from T̂
and yφ. Hence, as the distribution (
R←− [[Hash]]Aη ) is collision-free, the advantage ofB is non-negligible; contradiction.
3. Let T1 and T2 be two terms of sort s such that T1 =E T2. Consider the same frame as before: ϕ = {x1 = hs(T1, k), x2 =
hs(T2, k)}. As T1 =E T2 and hs is free, we have ϕ ≈E {x1 = n, x2 = n} where n is a fresh name of sort Hash (Proposition 19
of Appendix A). By assumption this entails that [[ϕ]] ≈ [[{x1 = n, x2 = n}]] thus
P
[
e′1, e
′
2
R←− [[hs(T1, k), hs(T2, k)]]Aη : e′1 =Aη e′2
]
 1− η
where η is a negligible function. As the implementation of hs is collision-resistant, we deduce that
P
[
e1, e2
R←− [[T1, T2]]Aη : e1 /=Aη e2
]
is negligible. Other properties follow from Proposition 1. 
3.2. ≈E-soundness implies classical assumptions on groups
In this section we present some interesting consequences of ≈E-soundness. Inspired by the work of Hohenberger and
Rivest on pseudo-freeness [33,34], we prove that several standard cryptographic assumptions on groups are implied by the
soundness of static equivalence.We concentrate on abelian groups as these aremore relevant for cryptographic applications.
We believe that similar techniques would apply for non-commutative groups as well.
We model an abelian group G with exponents taken over a commutative ring A by an abstract algebra over the following
signature:
∗ : G × G → G
1G : G
+ : A× A → A
0 : A
− : A → A
· : A× A → A
1A : A
exp : G × A → G
We use the inﬁx notation for the operators ∗, ·, +, and write ga to denote exp(g, a). Note that the inverse operation on G is
represented here by g → exp(g,−(1A)) = g−(1A). We consider the equational theory EG generated by the following equations
(where x, y, z are variables of sort G, and u, v,w variables of sort A):
u+ v = v + u
u+ (v +w) = (u+ v) +w
u+ 0A = u
u+ (−u) = 0A
u · v = v · u
u · (v ·w) = (u · v) ·w
u · 1A = u
(u+ v) ·w = u ·w + v ·w
x∗y = y∗x
x∗(y∗z) = (x∗y)∗z
x∗1G = x
(xu)v = x(u·v)
xu∗xv = xu+v
x1A = x
x0A = 1G
(x∗y)u = xu∗yu
We now recall several classical problems on groups. For cryptographic applications, it is desirable that these problems be
hard, that is, not feasible by any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary:
• discrete logarithm (DL) problem: given g and g′, ﬁnd a, such that ga = g′;
• computational Difﬁe–Hellman (CDH) problem: given g, ga and gb, ﬁnd gab;
• decisional Difﬁe–Hellman (DDH) problem: given g, ga and gb, distinguish gab from a random element gc;
• RSA problem: given elements a and ga, ﬁnd g.
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A more detailed presentation of these hard problems can be found in [?].
Assume a family of computational algebras (Aη) over the signature above such that (Aη) is ≈EG-sound, at least for some
subset of well-formed framesWF . Consider the two frames
ϕ1 = νg, a, b.{x1 = g, x2 = ga, x3 = gb, x4 = ga·b} and ϕ2 = νg, a, b, c.{x1 = g, x2 = ga, x3 = gb, x4 = gc}
and assume that ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ WF . Then no probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA can solve the DDH problem in (Aη) with
non-negligible probability.
Indeed, as suggested in [7], the question of (computationally) distinguishing these two frames exactly encodes the DDH
problem. Given the equational theory EG, we prove the formal equivalence ϕ1 ≈EG ϕ2 (Lemma 21 of Appendix B). Thus, by≈EG-soundness, the DDH problem is hard in (Aη).
Clearly, if one can solve the DL problem, one can also solve the CDH problem, which itself allows us to solve the DDH
problem. Therefore, the hardness of DDH implies the hardness of the two other problems.
In a similar way, we see that ≈EG-soundness on an augmented signature implies the hardness of RSA. Instead of directly
encoding the RSA problem, we introduce a slightly weaker decision problem, whose hardness implies the hardness of RSA.
The encoding of this problem requires the extension of the signature by a unary function symbol h : G → Hash, adding no
equation to the theory. Consider the two frames
ϕ3 = νg, a.{x1 = ga, x2 = a, x3 = h(g)} and ϕ4 = νg, a,h.{x1 = ga, x2 = a, x3 = h}
We prove that ϕ3 ≈EG ϕ4 in Lemma 22 of Appendix B. As above, if an implementation (Aη) is≈EG-sound of for some subset of
well-formed framesWF including ϕ3 and ϕ4, then the RSA problem cannot be efﬁciently solved in (Aη). Indeed, any adversary
A to the RSA-problem can be turned to an (equally efﬁcient) adversary against ([[ϕ3]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ4]]Aη ) simply as follows: given
a sample {x1 = e1, x2 = e2, x3 = e3} from either side, let e be the result ofA applied on η, e1 and e2; return 1 (“left-hand
side”) if [[h]]Aη (e) equals to e3, 0 otherwise.
An interestingopenquestion iswhether≈EG-soundness implies or is impliedbyRivest’s notionof pseudo-free groups [34],
or equivalently [36], the strong RSA property. We conjecture that the two notions are in fact incomparable. Indeed, on the
one hand, our notion implies the hardness of DDH, which remains an open question for strong RSA. On the other hand,
pseudo-freeness and strong RSA deal with a form of adaptive attackers while our model is purely non-adaptive.
4. A sufﬁcient (and often necessary) criterion for ≈E-soundness
We now present useful results for proving ≈E-soundness properties in general. Notably, we provide a sufﬁcient criterion
for ≈E-soundness in Section 4.1 and prove it necessary under additional assumptions in Section 4.2.
4.1. Ideal semantics and ≈E-soundness criterion
Given an implementation of the primitives, we have deﬁned in Section 2.3 the concrete semantics [[ϕ]]Aη associated to
every frame ϕ . We now deﬁne the ideal semantics of a frame ϕ, intuitively as the conditional distribution over all the concrete
values (in the appropriate space) that pass every formal test satisﬁed by ϕ.
Speciﬁcally, for every frame ϕ, we deﬁne the tests of ϕ to be
test(ϕ) = {(M,N) | var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ), names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅}.
We let eqE(ϕ) be the set of tests that are true in ϕ:
eqE(ϕ) = {(M,N) ∈ test(ϕ) |Mϕ =E Nϕ}
Note that, by deﬁnition, ϕ ≈E ϕ′ iff eqE(ϕ) ∩ test(ϕ′) = eqE(ϕ′) ∩ test(ϕ).
Let (Aη) be a family of computational algebras, ϕ = {x1 = T1, . . . , xn = Tn} be a frame, and si be the sort of xi. We deﬁne the
set of eligible, well-formed values for ϕ by
ValAη (ϕ) =
{
{x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} | (e1, . . . , en) ∈ [[s1]]Aη × . . . × [[sn]]Aη
}
and write φ
R←− [[ϕ]]val
Aη
for the process of drawing a random value φ = {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} from ValAη (ϕ) using the drawings
ei
R←− [[si]]Aη in the natural way.
Consider the following subset of concrete frames, intuitively, that pass all the valid tests of ϕ:
Val′Aη (ϕ) =
{
φ ∈ ValAη (ϕ) | ∀(M,N) ∈ eqE(ϕ),
P
[
u, v
R←− [[M,N]]Aη ,{x1=e1,... ,xn=en} : u = v
]
= 1
}
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Note that, provided that (Aη) is unconditionally =E-sound, Val′Aη (ϕ) is non-empty as it contains at least the values given by
the usual semantics of ϕ.
Deﬁnition 3 (Ideal semantics). Let (Aη) be an unconditionally =E-sound family of computational algebras and ϕ be a frame.
The ideal semantics of ϕ is the family of the distributions [[ϕ]]ideal
Aη
obtained by conditionning each distribution [[ϕ]]val
Aη
to the
set of values Val′Aη (ϕ). In other words, the probability to draw φ ∈ ValAη (ϕ) is
P
[
φ ← [[ϕ]]idealAη
]
=
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if φ ∈ Val′Aη (ϕ)
1
V P
[
φ
R←− [[ϕ]]val
Aη
]
otherwise
where V = P
[
φ0
R←− [[ϕ]]val
Aη
: φ0 ∈ Val′(ϕ)
]
.
We say that (Aη) has uniform distributions if and only if for every η and every sort s, [[s]]Aη is a ﬁnite set, =Aη ,s is the usual
equality, and the distribution associated to s by Aη is the uniform one over [[s]]Aη .
By classical property of conditional probabilities, we note that in the case of uniform distributions, the ideal semantics of
a frame ϕ coincides with the family of uniform distributions over the (ﬁnite, non-empty) sets Val′Aη (ϕ).
For instance, let ϕ = νn1,n2.{x1 = n1, x2 = n2} with n1 and n2 of sort s. Then, given that E is stable by substitution of
names, we have that eqE(ϕ) = {(M,N) ∈ test(ϕ) | M =E N}. By unconditional=E-soundness, we deduce that [[ϕ]]idealAη is simply
the uniform distribution over [[s]]Aη × [[s]]Aη .
We now state our≈E-soundness criterion: intuitively, the two semantics, concrete and ideal, should be indistinguishable.
Proposition 3 (≈E-soundness criterion). Let (Aη) be an unconditionally =E-sound family of computational algebras. Assume
that for every frame ϕ it holds that ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ]]idealAη ). Then (Aη) is ≈E-sound.
Proof. Let ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2. The equality eqE(ϕ1) ∩ test(ϕ2) = eqE(ϕ2) ∩ test(ϕ1) entails Val′Aη (ϕ1) = Val′Aη (ϕ2), thus the distribu-
tions [[ϕ1]]idealAη and [[ϕ2]]idealAη are equal. We use the transitivity of the indistinguishability relation ≈ to conclude: ([[ϕ1]]Aη ) ≈(
[[ϕ1]]idealAη
)
=
(
[[ϕ2]]idealAη
)
≈ ([[ϕ2]]Aη ). 
4.2. Transparent frames
In this section we show that our soundness criterion is necessary for a general class of equational theories, called
transparent theories. In those theories, each frame can be associated to an equivalent transparent frame (deﬁned below),
which is easier to analyze.
Deﬁnition 4 (Transparent frames). A frame ϕ is transparent for an equational theory E if each of its subterms is deducible
from ϕ in E.
Example 1. In the theory Eenc, the frame ϕ1 = {x1 = enc(enc(k4, k3), k1), x2 = enc(k1, k2), x3 = k2} is not transparent, as
neither k3 nor k4 are deducible, but the frame ϕ1 = {x1 = enc(n1, k1), x2 = enc(k1, k2), x3 = k2} is.
The following proposition ﬁnitely characterizes the equations veriﬁed by a transparent frame.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ be a transparent frame for E. Then, ϕ is of the form
ϕ = {x1 = C1[a1, . . . , am], . . . , xn = Cn[a1, . . . , am]}
where C1, . . . ,Cn are (not necessarily linear) contexts such that names(C1, . . . ,Cn) = ∅, C1[a1, . . . , am], . . . ,Cn[a1, . . . , am] are
closed and, a1, . . . , am are distinct deducible names: ϕ E ai.
For each ai, let Mai be a term such that var(Mai ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}, names(Mai ) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅ and Maiϕ =E ai. Then every
equation which holds in ϕ is a logical consequence of E and the equations xj = Cj[Ma1 , . . . ,Mam ], written
E ∪ {xj = Cj
[
Ma1 , . . . ,Mam
] | 1 j  n} |= eqE(ϕ)
By logical consequence, we refer to the usual ﬁrst-order theory of equality, where the variables x1, . . . , xn are considered here as
constants.
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Proof. Let (M,N) ∈ eqE(ϕ). By deﬁnition, we have Mϕ =E Nϕ, that is, M{xj → Cj[a1, . . . , am]}1jn =E N{xj →
Cj[a1, . . . , am]}1jn. Since E is stable by substitution of names, we obtain
M
{
xj → Cj
[
Ma1 , . . . ,Mam
]}
1jn =E N
{
xj → Cj
[
Ma1 , . . . ,Mam
]}
1jn
Using theequalitiesxj = Cj[Ma1 , . . . ,Mam ]andbytransitivity,weobtain {xj = Cj[Ma1 , . . . ,Mam ] | 1 j  n} ∪ E |= M = N. 
Another nice and useful property of transparent frames is that their concrete and ideal semantics coincide.
Proposition 5. Let (Aη) be an unconditionally =E-sound family of computational algebras, having uniform distributions. Let ϕ
be a transparent frame. The concrete and the ideal semantics of ϕ yield the same family of distributions: for all η, [[ϕ]]Aη = [[ϕ]]idealAη .
Proof. Let ϕ = {x1 = C1[a1, . . . , am], . . . , xn = Cn[a1, . . . , am]}, with Miϕ =E ai (1 i  m) as above. Let si be the sort of ai, s′j
be the sort of xj and η a given complexity parameter.
The usual concrete semantics of ϕ consists in mapping every drawing of names from the set E = [[s1]]Aη × . . . × [[sm]]Aη to
a value inF = ValAη (ϕ). Let us note α : E→F this function, deﬁned by:
α(e1, . . . , em) =
{
x1 = [[C1[y1, . . . , ym]]]{y1=e1,... ,ym=em}, . . . , xn = [[Cn[y1, . . . , ym]]]{y1=e1,... ,ym=em}
}
where the yi are fresh variables, respectively, of sort si, and we omit the subscript Aη for sake of clarity.
Using theMi, we can also deﬁne a function β :F→ E:
β(φ) = ([[M1]]φ , . . . , [[Mm]]φ)
We note that the distribution of [[Miϕ]] equals to that of [[Mi]]φ where φ R←− [[ϕ]], or equivalently, of [[Mi]]α(e1,... ,en) where
(e1, . . . , en)
R←− E. As Miϕ =E ai, (Aη) is unconditionally =E-sound, and no element of E has probability 0, we obtain that
β ◦ α = IdE . Thus α is injective and yields a bijection from E to its image G = α(E). By assumption, E is equipped with the
uniform distribution, therefore the concrete semantics of ϕ is the uniform distribution onG.
MoreoverG satisﬁes:
G={φ ∈F | α(β(φ)) = φ}
=
{
φ ∈F | ∀j, [[Cj[y1, . . . , ym]]]{y1=[[M1]]φ ,... ,ym=[[Mi]]φ } = [[xj]]φ
}
=
{
φ ∈F | ∀j, [[Cj[M1, . . . ,Mm]]]φ = [[xj]]φ
}
.
As ϕ is transparent, by Proposition 4, eqE(ϕ) is implied by the equations Cj[M1, . . . ,Mm] = xj and E. By unconditional =E-
soundness, we deduce that the values in G pass all the tests in eqE(ϕ); in other words, G ⊆ Val′Aη (ϕ). Conversely, every
element of Val′Aη (ϕ) is trivially inG; thereforeG = Val′Aη (ϕ). SinceF is equipped with uniform distribution, we obtain that
the ideal semantics of ϕ coincides with the uniform distribution onG, and therefore with its concrete semantics. 
A noticeable consequence of Proposition 5 is that, in the case of uniform distributions, two statically-equivalent trans-
parent frames are always indistinguishable. (The argument is similar to that of Proposition 3.) This motivates the following
deﬁnition, for the purpose of studying ≈E-soundness or a converse to Proposition 3.
Deﬁnition 5. An equational theory E is transparent if and only if for every frame ϕ, there exists a (not necessarily unique)
transparent frame ϕ such that ϕ ≈E ϕ.
Transparent frames and theories are related to the notion of patterns introduced by Abadi and Rogaway [4] and used in
subsequent work [13,12] so as to deﬁne computationally sound formal equivalences. There, messages are ﬁrst mapped to
patterns by replacing non-deducible subterms with boxes. By deﬁnition, two messages are then equivalent if and only if
they yield the same pattern (up to renaming of names). For example, if {M}K denotes the probabilistic encryption of M by
a key K , the message
({{K4}K3 }K1 , {K1}K2 , K2) is mapped to the pattern ({}K1 , {K1}K2 , K2). (Compare with Example 1 where
we have ϕ1 ≈Eenc ϕ1.)
However, the notion of transparent frames is deﬁned for any equational theory. Also, it might be the case that a frame
corresponds to several transparent frames. For example, consider the theory of the exclusive OR (given in Section 5.1) and
the frame:
ϕ = {x1 = n1 ⊕ n2, x2 = n2 ⊕ n3, x3 = n1 ⊕ n3}.
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Thereareseveral transparent framesequivalent toϕ, for instance {x1 = n1 ⊕ n2, x2 = n1, x3 = n2}, {x1 = n1, x2 = n1 ⊕ n2, x3 =
n2} and {x1 = n1, x2 = n2, x3 = n1 ⊕ n2}.
Webelieve that thenotionof transparent frames is relevant inmany theories useful in cryptography. As amatter of fact, the
two theories of exclusive OR and ciphers considered in Section 5 are transparent. However, the notion of transparent frames
does not subsume that of patterns, deﬁned by Abadi and Rogaway. In particular, for the theory of probabilistic symmetric
encryption, that is,
Esenc = {sdec(senc(x, y, z), y) = x, sdec_success(senc(x, y, z), y) = ok},
it is unclear how to associate an equivalent transparent frame to the frame νn, k, r.{x = senc(n, k, r), y = k}, although it is
arguably a pattern in the sense of Abadi and Rogaway (once cast into our syntax). The reason is that the random coin r is not
deducible, but the term senc(n, k, r) cannotbe replacedwith a freshnamebecauseof thevisible equation sdec_success(x, y) =
ok. We might exclude r from being a subterm by modifying the notion of subterms (for example, in Abadi and Rogaway’s
work, the random factor does not appear explicitely in terms). However, this would undermine the properties of transparent
frames mentioned above. Thus, we regard the notions of patterns and transparent frames as complementary.
Note that we have proved en passant that ≈E is decidable for transparent theories E for which =E is decidable, provided
that the reduction to equivalent transparent frames is effective. Indeed, given two frames ϕ1 and ϕ2, we associate to each of
them one of its statically equivalent transparent frame ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively. It is then straightforward to check whether
ϕ1 and ϕ2 are equivalent using the ﬁnite characterization of eqE(ϕi) by Proposition 4.
Finally, we establish a completeness result for our soundness criterion in the cases of transparent theories.
Theorem 6. Assumea transparent theoryE. Let (Aη)bea family of computational algebras such that (Aη)hasuniformdistributions,
is≈E-sound and unconditionally=E-sound. Then the soundness criterion of Proposition 3 is satisﬁed: for every frame ϕ, ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈
([[ϕ]]ideal
Aη
).
Proof. Since E is transparent, there exists a transparent frame ϕ such that ϕ ≈E ϕ. By ≈E-soundness, we deduce ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈
([[ϕ]]Aη ). By Proposition 5, we have that ([[ϕ]]Aη ) = ([[ϕ]]idealAη ). Altogether, we conclude that ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ]]idealAη ) since ϕ ≈E ϕ
implies ([[ϕ]]ideal
Aη
) = ([[ϕ]]ideal
Aη
) as before. 
5. Examples
Wenowapply the framework of Sections 3 and4 to establish two≈E-soundness results, concerning the theory of exclusive
OR and that of ciphers and lists.
5.1. Exclusive OR
We study the soundness and faithfulness problems for the natural theory and implementation of the exclusive OR (XOR),
together with constants and (pure) random numbers.
The formal model consists of a single sort Data, an inﬁnite number of names, the inﬁx symbol ⊕ : Data× Data → Data
and two constants 0, 1 : Data. Terms are equipped with the equational theory E⊕ generated by:
(x ⊕ y) ⊕ z = x ⊕ (y ⊕ z)
x ⊕ y = y ⊕ x
x ⊕ x = 0
x ⊕ 0 = x
As an implementation, we deﬁne the computational algebras Aη , η  0:
• the concrete domain [[Data]]Aη is the set of bit-strings of length η, {0, 1}η , equipped with the uniform distribution;
• ⊕ is interpreted by the usual XOR function over {0, 1}η;
• [[0]]Aη = 0η and [[1]]Aη = 1η .
In this setting, statically equivalent frames enjoy an algebraic characterization. Let AC be the equational theory corre-
sponding to the two left-hand equations for associativity and commutativity. We use the other two equations as a rewriting
systemR⊕
x ⊕ x → 0
x ⊕ 0 → x
wherewe allow arbitrary AC-manipulations before and after each rewriting step. It is easy to show thatR⊕ is AC-convergent.
Speciﬁcally, a term T is inR⊕/AC-normal form (or simply normal form in the following) if and only if each name, variable
and constant 1 occur at most once in T , and 0 does not occur in T unless T = 0.
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Let a1, . . . , an be distinct names. Using the rewriting system R⊕/AC, every closed term T with names(T) ⊆ {a1, . . . , an}
can be written T =E⊕ β0 ⊕
⊕n
j=1 βj aj where βj ∈ {0, 1}, the aj are mutually distinct, and we use the convention 0aj = 0 and
1aj = aj . In the following, we see {0, 1} as the two-element ﬁeld F2; thus terms modulo =E⊕ form a F2-vector space.
Similarly a frame ϕ with names(ϕ) ⊆ {a1, . . . , an} is written
ϕ =E⊕
⎧⎨
⎩x1 = α1,0 ⊕
n⊕
j=1
α1,j aj , . . . , xm = αm,0 ⊕
n⊕
j=1
αm,j aj
⎫⎬
⎭
where αi,j ∈ F2. Let us group the coefﬁcients into a (m+ 1) × (n+ 1)-matrix α = (αi,j) over F2. Then, ϕ is described by the
formal relation⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
x1
.
.
.
xm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 . . . 0
α1,0 α1,1 . . . α1,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
αm,0 αm,1 . . . αm,n
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
a1
.
.
.
an
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
We now characterize the set eqE⊕ (ϕ) of equations valid in ϕ. Let M and N be two terms such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(φ),
names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅. First note that Mϕ =E⊕ Nϕ if and only if (M ⊕ N)ϕ =E⊕ 0. Therefore we only study the case
where N = 0.
Assume M in normal form. Mϕ =E⊕ 0 and names(M) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅ implies names(M) = ∅. Let M =AC β0 ⊕
⊕m
i=1 βi xi.
The conditionMϕ =E⊕ 0 is equivalent to the vectorial equation
(β0, . . . ,βm) · α = 0
that is, (β0, . . . ,βm) belongs to the co-kernel of α, noted coker(α).
Finally let ϕ and ϕ′ be two frames with names(ϕ,ϕ′) ⊆ {a1, . . . , an} and dom(ϕ) = dom(ϕ′) = {x1, . . . , xm}. Let α and α′ be
the two corresponding (m+ 1) × (n+ 1)-matrices deﬁned as above. From the previous discussion, we deduce that
ϕ ≈E⊕ ϕ′ ⇔ coker(α) = coker(α′)
that is, if we write im(α) = {α · γ } the image of α, we have by duality
ϕ ≈E⊕ ϕ′ ⇔ im(α) = im(α′) (1)
This characterization is the key point of our main result for the theory of XOR.
Theorem 7. The implementation of XOR for the considered signature, (Aη), is unconditionally =E⊕-, ≈E⊕- and E⊕-sound. It is
also =E⊕-, ≈E⊕- and E⊕-faithful.
Proof. The unconditional =E⊕-soundness is clear, hence the E⊕-faithfulness (Proposition 1).
Let us show that (Aη) is =E⊕-faithful. Assume that T1 and T2 are two terms such that T1 /=E⊕ T2. This is equivalent to
T1 ⊕ T2 /=E⊕ 0. Thus it is sufﬁcient to consider the case where T /= 0 is a closed term in normal form. The semantics of T is
either the constant 1η (if T = 1) or the uniform distribution (if T /= 1) on {0, 1}η . Thus P
[
[[T ]]Aη = 0
]
is negligible. Hence the
=E⊕-faithfulness holds and by proposition 1, so does the ≈E⊕-faithfulness.
We now address the unconditional≈E⊕-soundness. Let ϕ be a frame, and α = (αi,j) its (m+ 1) × (n+ 1)-matrix associated
as before. Let us see α as a F2-linear function from (F2)
n+1 to (F2)m+1.
For simplicity, let us ﬁx the order of variables in dom(ϕ) and assimilate the possible concrete values of ϕ, ValAη (ϕ), to the
setF = {1η} × (F2)mη where the ﬁrst η 1-bits are added for technical reasons.
The usual concrete semantics of ϕ consists in drawing a random vector uniformly from E = {1η} × (F2)nη for the value of
names, andthenapplyingaF2-linear function α̂ : (F2)(n+1)η →(F2)(m+1)η to it. Speciﬁcally, ifwesee (F2)(n+1)η asF2η×. . . × F2η︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
and similarly for (F2)
(m+1)η , the function α̂ is deﬁned by
α̂
(
f0, . . . , fn
) =
⎛
⎝ n⊕
j=0
α0,j fj , . . . ,
n⊕
j=0
αm,j fj
⎞
⎠
Since α̂ is linear, all the inverse images α̂−1({x}), x ∈ im(̂α), have the same cardinal. Hence, the concrete semantics of ϕ is
also the uniform distribution over α̂(E) = im(̂α) ∩F.
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Assume a second frame ϕ′ such that ϕ ≈E⊕ ϕ′. Deﬁne α′ and α̂′ similarly as above. By Eq. (1), we have im(α) = im(α′).
Now, if we see (F2)
(m+1)η as F2
m+1 × . . . × F2m+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
, we may write α̂ = α × . . . × α︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
and similarly for α′. Thus,
im(̂α) = im(α) × . . . × im(α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
= im(α′) × . . . × im(α′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
= im(α̂′)
which implies that ϕ and ϕ′ have the same concrete semantics. Thus E⊕ is unconditionally ≈E⊕-sound.
Last, we prove the unconditional E⊕-soundness. Let ϕ be a frame and T a term, both in normal form, such that ϕ E⊕ T
and names(T) ⊆ names(ϕ) = {a1, . . . , an}. Let α be associated to ϕ as before and T =AC β0 ⊕
⊕n
j=1 βj aj .
Let γ be the (m+ 2) × (n+ 1)-matrix obtained by augmenting α with a last row equal to β = (β0, . . . ,βn):
γ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 . . . 0
α1,0 α1,1 . . . α1,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
αm,0 αm,1 . . . αm,n
β0 β1 . . . βn0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Since ϕ E⊕ T , in particular there exists no M in normal form such that names(M) = ∅ and Mϕ =E⊕ T . In other words, β is
linearly independent from the other rows in the matrix γ above.
In particular, it is independent from the ﬁrst row (1, 0, . . . , 0), that is, there exists j  1 such that βj /= 0. We deduce that
the distribution (
R←− [[T ]]Aη ) is the uniform one over {0, 1}η , thus it is collision-free.
As for the ﬁrst condition of unconditional E-soundness, by a similar reasoning as before, we have that the concrete
semantics of (ϕ, T) is the uniform distribution over the image of E = {1η} × (F2)nη by γ̂ (deﬁned similarly as α̂ above). Let
us see β a linear function from (F2)
n+1 to F2 and deﬁne β̂ as previously. Next we prove that the image γ̂ (E) is the cartesian
product of the two sets α̂(E) and β̂(E). It follows that the drawings for ϕ and T are independent.
The inclusion γ̂ (E) ⊆ α̂(E) × β̂(E) is trivial. As β is independent from the rows of α, there exists a vector u ∈ (F2)n+1
such that β(u) = 1 and α(u) = 0 (otherwise ker(β) ⊇ ker(α) implies β ∈ coim(β) ⊆ coim(α)). Let x, y ∈ E. We prove that there
exists z ∈ E such that α̂(z) = α̂(x) ∈ (F2)(m+1)η and β̂(z) = β̂(y) ∈ (F2)η .
Indeed, let us see E as ({1} × (F2)n)η . Using the corresponding bases, let x = (x1, . . . , xη) and y = (y1, . . . , yη) with xi, yi ∈
{1} × (F2)n. We let zi = xi + (β(yi) − β(xi)) · u and z = (z1, . . . , zη). Thus, α̂(z) = (α(z1), . . . ,α(zη)) = (α(x1), . . . ,α(xη)) = α̂(x)
and β̂(z) = (β(z1), . . . ,β(zη)) = (β(y1), . . . ,β(yη)) = β̂(y). Besides, α(u) = 0 implies that the ﬁrst coordinate of u is 0, thus the
ﬁrst coordinate of each zi is 1, that is, z ∈ E. 
We conclude this section by a proof that the E⊕ is transparent as announced in Section 4.
Proposition 8. The equational theory E⊕ is transparent.
Proof. Indeed, let ϕ be frame and α be its associated (m+ 1) × (n+ 1)-matrix as before. Let d be the dimension of im(α).
There exists a (m+ 1) × d sub-matrix α′ of α such that α′ is injective and im(α′) = im(α) (consider a maximal independent
set of columns of α). As the ﬁrst column of α is independent from the others (it starts with a 1 whereas the others start with
a 0), we may assume without loss of generality that the ﬁrst column of α′ is that of α. (In particular d  1.)
Let a′
1
. . . a′
d−1 be distinct names. We let ϕ
′ be the frame associated to α′, described by the relation
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
x1
.
.
.
xm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ = α′ ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
a′
1
.
.
.
a′
d−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
As im(α′) = im(α), we have ϕ′ ≈E⊕ ϕ. Besides, since α′ is injective, there exists α′′ such that α′′ · α′ is the identity d × d-matrix.
This entails that every a′
i
is deducible from ϕ′, that is, ϕ′ is transparent. 
5.2. Symmetric, deterministic, length-preserving encryption and lists
We now detail the example of symmetric, deterministic and length-preserving encryption schemes. Such schemes, also
knownaspseudo-randompermutationsor ciphers [37], arewidelyused inpractice, themost famousexamples (forﬁxed-length
inputs) being DES and AES.
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Our formal model consists of a set of sortsS = {Data, List0, List1 . . . Listn . . . }, an inﬁnite number of names for every sort
Data and Listn, and the following symbols (for every n 0):
encn, decn : Listn × Data → Listn encryption, decryption
consn : Data× Listn → Listn+1 list constructor
headn : Listn+1 → Data head of a list
tailn : Listn+1 → Listn tail of a list
nil : List0 empty list
0, 1 : Data constants
We consider the equational theory Esym generated by the following equations (for every n 0 and for every name a0 of sort
List0):
decn(encn(x, y), y) = x
encn(decn(x, y), y) = x
headn(consn(x, y)) = x
tailn(consn(x, y)) = y
consn(headn(x), tailn(x)) = x
enc0(nil, x) = nil
dec0(nil, x) = nil
tail0(x) = nil
a0 = nil
where x, y are variables of the appropriate sorts in each case. The effect of the last four equations is that the sort List0 is
degenerated in Esym, that is, all terms of sort List0 are equal. When oriented from left to right, the equations above form a
convergent rewriting system writtenR.
Notice that each term has a unique sort. As the subscripts n of function symbols are redundant with sorts, we tend to
omit them in terms. For instance, if k, k′ : Data, we may write enc(cons(k, nil), k′) instead of enc1(cons0(k, nil), k′).
The concrete meaning of sorts and symbols is given by the computational algebras Aη , η > 0, deﬁned as follows:
• the carrier sets are [[Data]]Aη = {0, 1}η and [[Listn]]Aη = {0, 1}nη equipped with the uniform distribution and the usual
equality relation;
• encn, decn are implemented by a cipher for data of size nη and keys of size η; (we discuss the required cryptographic
assumptions later);
• [[nil]]Aη is the empty bit-string, [[consn]]Aη is the usual concatenation, [[0]]Aη = 0η , [[1]]Aη = 1η , [[headn]]Aη returns the η ﬁrst
digits of bit-strings (of size (n+ 1)η) whereas [[tailn]]Aη returns the last nη digits.
We emphasize that no tags are added to messages. Tags—and in particular tags under encryption—would be harmful to the
≈Esym-soundness. Indeedwe expect that the formal equivalence νa, b.{x = enc(a, b), y = b} ≈Esym νa, b, c.{x = enc(a, b), y = c}
also holds in the computational world; but this would not be the case if a is tagged before encryption. In case a was tagged
before encryption, an adversary could use the tag to check the success of decrypting enc(a, b) with b.
For simplicity we assume without loss of generality that encryption keys have the same size η as blocks of data. We also
assume that keys are generated according to the uniform distribution.
It is not difﬁcult to prove that the above implementation is unconditionally=Esym-sound (by induction on the structure of
terms and equational proofs), that is, every true formal equality holds with probability 1 in the concrete world. We note that
the equation encn(decn(x, y), y) = x is satisﬁed because encryption by a given key is length-preserving and injective, hence
also surjective.
Before studying the≈Esym-soundness, we need to characterize statically equivalent frames. Speciﬁcally, we show that this
theory is transparent.
Proposition 9. Let ϕ be a closed frame. There exists a transparent frame ϕ such that ϕ ≈Esym ϕ.
The proof of Proposition 9 relies on the following Lemma 10, that is used stepwise to rewrite a frame into a transparent
frame.
Lemma 10. Let ϕ be a closed frame in R-normal form. Let T be a subterm of ϕ of the form T = enc(U,V), T = dec(U,V), T =
head(V) or, T = tail(V) and n a fresh name of the same sort than T . Assume that V is not deducible from ϕ, that is, ϕ Esym V . Then
we have that
ϕ ≈Esym ϕ′
where ϕ′ = ϕ{T → n} is obtained by replacing every occurrence of T in ϕ with n.
The proof of Lemma 10 is given in Appendix C.We prove Proposition 9 by applying this lemma repeatedly on an initial frame
ϕ. The procedure terminates as each rewriting step decreases the total size of non-deducible subterms in the frame. Besides,
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the resulting frame ϕ is transparent. Indeed, by contradiction, suppose that ϕ is not transparent; deﬁne T as the father of the
largest non-deducible subtermof ϕ; it is easy to see that T is necessarily of the form T = enc(U,V), T = dec(U,V), T = head(V)
or T = tail(V) with ϕ Esym V ; thus Lemma 10 applies.
Note that for any subtermW , ϕ Esym W implies ϕ{T → n} Esym W{T → n}. As a consequence, the procedure above yields
a unique transparent frame ϕ (modulo renaming), no matter in which order the subterms T are substituted.
Provided that Esym is decidable,1 the above procedure for associating transparent frames to frames is effective. Thus, as
noticed in Section4.2,weobtain another proof of thedecidability of≈Esym usingProposition4.Notice that statically equivalent
transparent frames may not be equal modulo renaming: consider for instance {x = enc(a, b), y = b} ≈Esym {x = c, y = b}.
Wenowstudy the≈Esym-soundness problemunder classical cryptographic assumptions. Standard assumptions on ciphers
include the notions of super pseudo-random permutation (SPRP) and several notions of indistinguishability (IND-Pi-Cj, i, j =
0, 1, 2). In particular, IND-P1-C1 denotes the indistinguishability against lunchtime chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext
attacks. These notions and the relations between them have been studied notably in [37].
Initially, the SPRP and IND-P1-C1 assumptions apply to (block) ciphers specialized to plaintexts of a given size. Interest-
ingly, this is not sufﬁcient to imply ≈Esym-soundness for frames which contain plaintexts of heterogeneous sizes, encrypted
under the same key. Thus we introduce a strengthened version of IND-P1-C1, applying to a collection of ciphers (Eη,n,Dη,n),
where η is the complexity parameter and n 0 is the number of blocks of size η contained in plaintexts and ciphertexts.
One may note that there exist operation modes which turn a ﬁxed size block cipher realizing SPRP into a cipher which
handles variable length inputs while preserving SPRP. We refer the reader to [38] for an example of such a mode and further
references.
We deﬁne the ω-IND-P1-C1 assumption by considering the following experiment Gη with a 2-stage adversary
A = (A1,A2):
• ﬁrst a key k is randomly chosen from {0, 1}η;
• (Stage 1) A1 is given access to the encryption oracles Eη,n(·, k) and the decryption oracles Dη,n(·, k); it outputs two
plaintextsm0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}n0η for some n0, and possibly some data d;
• (Stage 2) a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is drawn;A2 receives the data d, the challenge ciphertext c = Eη,n0 (mb, k) and outputs a
bit b′;
• A is successful inGη iff b = b′ and it has never submittedm0 orm1 to an encryption oracle, nor c to a decryption oracle.
Deﬁne the advantage ofA as
Advω-IND-P1-C1A (η) = 2× P
[
A is successful inGη
]− 1 (2)
The ω-IND-P1-C1 assumption holds for (Eη,n,Dη,n) iff the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is negli-
gible. It holds for the inverse of the encryption scheme iff it holds for the collection of ciphers (Dη,n,Eη,n).
As in previous work [4,13,18,23], we restrict frames to those with only atomic keys and no encryption cycles. Speciﬁcally,
a closed frame ϕ has only atomic keys if for all subterms encn(u, v) and decn(u, v) of ϕ, v is a name. Given two (atomic) keys
k1 and k2, we say that k1 encrypts k2 in ϕ, written k1 >ϕ k2, iff there exists a subterm U of ϕ of the form U = encn(T , k1) or
U = decn(T , k1) such that k2 appears in T not used as a key, that is, k2 appears in T at a position which is not the right-hand
argument of a encn′ or a decn′ . An encryption cycle is a tuple k1 . . . km such that k1 >ϕ . . . >ϕ km >ϕ k1.
The effect of the condition “not used as a key” is to allow consideringmore terms as free of encryption cycles, for instance
encn(encn(a, k), k). This improvement is already suggested in [4].
We now state our ≈Esym-soundness theorem. A closed frame is well-formed iff itsR-normal form has only atomic keys,
contains no encryption cycles and uses no head and tail symbols.
Theorem 11 (≈Esym-soundness). Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two well-formed frames of the same domain. Assume that the concrete
implementations for the encryption and its inverse satisfy both the ω-IND-P1-C1 assumption. If ϕ1 ≈Esym ϕ2 then ([[ϕ1]]Aη ) ≈
([[ϕ2]]Aη ).
Before proving Theorem 11, we establish a computational counterpart to Lemma 10.
Lemma 12. Let ϕ be a closed frame inR-normal form,with only atomic keys and no encryption cycles. Let T be a subterm of ϕ of
the form T = enc(U, k) (respectively T = dec(U, k)), with k name of sort Data, and n a fresh name of the same sort as T . Assume
that
• the only occurrences of k in ϕ are in the positions of an encryption or decryption key: enc(., k) or dec(., k);
• T itself does not appear under an encryption or a decryption with k;
• the concrete implementations for the encryption and its inverse satisfy both the ω-IND-P1-C1 assumption.
1 A classical characterization of deducibility, entailing its decidability, is detailed in Lemma 23 of Appendix C.
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Then we have that
([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ′]]Aη )
where ϕ′ = ϕ{T → n} is obtained by replacing every occurrence of T in ϕ with n.
Notice that the hypothesis of Lemma 12 are stronger than its formal version, Lemma 10. For instance the encryption key k is
required to be atomic; the ﬁrst condition on k implies that k is not deducible from ϕ. Also nothing is said about head and tail
symbols.
Proof (of Lemma12).Beforeproving the lemma, let us consider the example of awell-formed frameϕ1 = {x1 = enc(T1, k), x2
= enc(T2, k)}, where k does not appear in T1, T2, and T1 /=Esym T2. This frame is statically equivalent to ϕ2 = {x1 = n1; x2 = n2}.
Our problem here is to prove that [[ϕ1]] and [[ϕ2]] are actually indistinguishable. It is not hard to see that this will be the case
if and only if the probability that T1 and T2 have the same concrete value is negligible. A consequence of this phenomenon
is intuitively that we need to prove Lemma 12 and—at least—a limited form of =Esym-faithfulness at the same time.
Formally, letuswrite |ϕ|e and |T |e for thenumberofdistinct subtermswithheadsymbolsencordec, occurring, respectively,
in a frame ϕ and a term T . Let Pn and Qn be the two properties:
(Pn) Lemma 12 holds provided that |ϕ|e  n :
For every R-normal, closed frame ϕ containing only atomic keys, no encryption cycles, and such that |ϕ|e  n, for
every maximal subterm T of ϕ of the form T = enc(U, k) or T = dec(U, k), for every fresh name n of the appriopriate
sort, if the only occurrences of k in ϕ are in key positions (i.e. enc(., k) or dec(., k)), then ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ{T → n}]]Aη ).
(Qn) For allR-normal terms T1, T2 of the samesort such that: T1, T2 haveonly atomic keys, the frameϕ = {x = T1, y = T2}
has no encryption cycles, T1 /= T2 and |ϕ|e  n, the probability P
[
e1, e2 ← [[T1, T2]]Aη ; e1 = e2
]
is negligible.
Weprove Pn andQn bymutual induction onn, that is,morepreciselyweprove the four statements: (S1) P0, (S2) Pn+1 ⇐ Qn,
(S3) Q0, (S4) Qn+1 ⇐ (Pn+1 and Qn).
(S1) P0 is vacuously true.
(S2) Pn+1 ⇐ Qn. Let T0 = encn0 (U, k) be a subterm of ϕ, k and n two names all satisfying the conditions of Lemma 12.
(Naturally, the case of T0 = decn0 (U, k) is similar.) Let ϕ = {x1 = T01 , . . . , xn = T0n }.
Provided an adversaryA able to distinguish ([[ϕ]]Aη ) and ([[ϕ′]]Aη ), we build an adversary B against the ω-IND-P1-C1
assumption on encryption, described as follows:
1. for each name a of sort s appearing in ϕ, draw a value â
R←− [[s]]Aη ;
2. draw a value â0
R←− [[s]]Aη for some fresh name a0 of sort Listn0 ;
3. for each xi (1 i  n) of sort si, compute T̂0i ∈ [[si]]A recursively as follows:
̂encn(T , k)=En (̂T) if T /= Ûencn0 (U, k)=E∗(Û, â0)̂decn(T , k)=Dn (̂T)̂f (T1, . . . , Tn)=[[f ]]Aη (T̂1, . . . , T̂n) in the remaining cases
wherewehavewrittenEn(.) andDn(.) for the encryption anddecryptionoracles of theω-IND-P1-C1game, andE
∗
(Û, â0)
for the challenge ciphertext, obtainedafter submitting the twoplaintexts Û and â0. SinceT
0 = encn0 (U, k) is not a subterm
of an encryption or a decryption with k, we may assume that E∗(Û, â0) is computed only once, after every call to En(.)
andDn(.);
4. submit the concrete frame {x1 = T̂1, . . . , xn = T̂n} toA and return the same answer.
The distribution computed by B and submitted toA equals either ([[ϕ]]Aη ) or ([[ϕ′]]Aη ) depending on whichever E∗(Û, â0)
is the encryption of Û, or, respectively, that of â0 (in the latter case E
∗
(Û, â0) = En0 (â0) is simply a random number). Thus
the probability that B guesses the right answer is the same asA. Now it may happen that B does not meet the second
requirement for winning the ω-IND-P1-C1 game, that is: (i) there exists a subterm encn0 (T , k) such that T /= U and T̂ ∈ {Û, â0}
or (ii) there exists a subterm decn0 (T , k) such that T̂ = E∗(Û, â0).
For (i), the probability that T̂ = â0 is negligible by construction. Moreover, as T and T0 = encn0 (U, k) are two subterms of
ϕ and T0 is not a subterm of T , the frame ϕ′ = {x = T , y = U} has no encryption cycles and |ϕ′|e < |ϕ|e = n+ 1. The induction
hypothesis Qn implies that the probability for T̂ = Û is negligible.
As for (ii), if the challenge ciphertextE∗(Û, â0) is the encryptionof its secondargument, that isEn0 (â0), then theprobability
for T̂ = E∗(Û, â0) is negligible; otherwise E∗(Û, â0) = En0 (Û). Recall that T0 = encn0 (U, k) is in R-normal form, thus U /=
decn0 (T , k). As T0 and decn0 (T , k) are two subterms of ϕ and T0 is not a subterm of decn0 (T , k), the frame ϕ′ = {x = U, y =
decn0 (T , k)} has no encryption cycles and |ϕ′|e < |ϕ|e = n+ 1, hence the induction hypothesis Qn implies that the probability
for T̂ = En0 (Û) is negligible.
To simplify the case analysis of (S3) and (S4), it is convenient to introduce the following lemma:
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Lemma 13. Let T1, T2 be two terms of sort Listj. Deﬁne for each 1 i  j, the i-th projection of a term T of sort Listj , by:
πi(T) = head(tail(. . . tail︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1 times
(T)))
Then (i) T1 =Esym T2 iff for all 1 i  j,πi(T1) =Esym πi(T2) and moreover (ii) P
[
e1, e2 ← [[T1, T2]]Aη ; e1 = e2
]
is negligible iff
for all 1 i  j,
P
[
ei1, e
i
2 ← [[πi(T1) ↓R,πi(T2) ↓R]]Aη ; ei1 = ei2
]
is negligible.
(The notation T ↓R stands for theR-normal form of T .)
Thanks to this lemma, it is sufﬁcient to prove (S3) and (S4) for T1 and T2 of sortData and inR-normal form. (Indeed notice
that if ϕ = {x = T1, y = T2} has no encryption cycles, then ϕ′ = {x′ = πi(T1) ↓R, y′ = πi(T2) ↓R} has no encryption cycles and
|ϕ′|e  |ϕ|e.)
Given the sorting system and the rewriting rules, aR-reduced term T of sort Datamay only be of the following forms:
1. a constant: 0 or 1,
2. a name of sort Data: T = a,
3. a projection of name of sort Listj: T = πi(a) (1 i  j),
4. a projection of a encryption/decryption of sort Listj: T = πi(enc(U,V)) with U ∈ {dec(T ′,V)} or T = πi(dec(U,V)) with
U ∈ {enc(T ′,V)}.
(S3) Q0. As T1 and T2 contain no encryption/decryption symbol, only the cases 1–3 of the case analysis above can occur;
the property follows directly.
(S4) Qn+1 ⇐ (Pn+1 and Qn). Let T1 and T2 be two distinct closed normal terms and ϕ = {x = T1, y = T2}. Assume that ϕ has
no encryption cycles nor composed keys, and |ϕ|e = n+ 1.
1. If one of the two terms—say T1— is of the form 1 (constant), 2 (name) or 3 (projection of a name). Then T2 is of the form
4, for instance T2 = πi(enc(U, k)) with U ∈ {dec(T ′, k)}.
a) If T1 /= k, by Pn+1, we have ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[{x = T1, y = πi(a)}]]Aη ) for some fresh name a. In particular, the probability
for the two components x and y to be equal is negligible.
b) If T1 = k, assume that T1 and T2 yields the same concrete value with signiﬁcant probability. Let Listn0 be the sort of
U. We build an adversaryA to the ω-IND-P1-C1 game as follows:
i) for each name a of sort s appearing in T2, draw a value â
R←− [[s]]Aη ;
ii) draw a value â0
R←− [[s]]Aη for some fresh name a0 of sort Listn0 ;
iii) compute T̂2 recursively as follows:
̂encn(T , k)=En (̂T) if T /= Ûencn0 (U, k)=E∗(Û, â0)̂decn(T , k)=Dn (̂T)̂f (V1, . . . ,Vn)=[[f ]]Aη (V̂1, . . . , V̂n) in the remaining cases
using the same conventions as before;
iv) if En0 (Û, T̂2) = E∗(Û, â0)), return 0, otherwise return 1.
A guesses the correct answer with non-negligible probability. As before, we use the property Qn to conclude that
its advantage is non-negligible.
2. Suppose T1 = πi1 (enc(u1, k1)) and T2 = πi2 (enc(u2, k2)) (the three other cases with decryption symbols are similar). As ϕ
has no encryption cycle, we may assume for instance that k1 is maximal for<ϕ . Let T be a maximal subterm of the form
enc(U, k1) or dec(U, k1) in ϕ. By Pn+1, we have ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ′]]Aη ) where ϕ′ = ϕ{T → a} = {x = T ′1, y = T ′2} for some fresh
name a. We then apply Qn to T
′
1
and T ′
2
. 
Proof (of Lemma 13). Point (i) is easily shown by induction on i, using the equations of Esym. For (ii), notice that:
P
[
e1, e2 ← [[T1, T2]]Aη ; e1 = e2
]

j∑
i=1
P
[
ei1, e
i
2 ← [[πi(T1),πi(T2)]]Aη ; ei1 = ei2
]
and
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∀i, P
[
e1, e2 ← [[T1, T2]]Aη ; e1 = e2
]
 P
[
ei1, e
i
2 ← [[πi(T1),πi(T2)]]Aη ; ei1 = ei2
]
Besides it is clear from the unconditional =Esym-soundness, that for any T1, T2:
P
[
e1, e2 ← [[T1, T2]]Aη ; e1 = e2
]
= P
[
e1, e2 ← [[T1 ↓R, T2 ↓R]]Aη ; e1 = e2
]

Proof (of Theorem 11). Thanks to the (unconditional) =Esym-soundness, it is enough to prove the property on frames in
R-normal form.
We begin by proving the following lemma:
Lemma 14. Assume that the concrete implementations for the encryptionand its inverse satisfy both theω-IND-P1-C1assumption.
For every well-formed R-normal frame ϕ, ([[ϕ]]Aη ) ≈ ([[ϕ]]Aη ) where ϕ is the transparent frame associated to ϕ following the
algorithmic proof of Proposition 9 (this transparent frame is uniquely deﬁned modulo renaming of names).
Now recall that by Proposition 5 and since ϕ ≈ ϕ, we have:
[[ϕ]]Aη = [[ϕ]]idealAη = [[ϕ]]idealAη
Therefore the soundness criterion holds for well-formedR-normal frames and we conclude by Proposition 3. 
Notice that the use of the ideal semantics could not be easily avoided as two statically equivalent transparent framesmay
not be equal modulo renaming of bound names.
Proof (of Lemma14).Weprove thepropertyby inductionon thenumbermof encryptions anddecryptionsbynon-deducible
keys in ϕ.
Ifm = 0, by the well-formedness condition, ϕ is already a transparent frame.
Suppose thatm > 0. As ϕ has no encryption cycle, we choose a non-deducible (atomic) key k appearing in ϕ, such that k
is maximal for the encryption relation >ϕ .
As k is not deducible, is maximal for >ϕ and ϕ contains no head and tail symbols, the only occurrences of k in ϕ are as
encryption or decryption keys. Let T be amaximal subtermof ϕ of the form T = enc(U, k)or T = dec(U, k).We apply Lemma12
on ϕ and T and conclude by induction hypothesis on the obtained frame ϕ′. 
Note on the cryptographic assumptions. Cryptographic assumptions of Theorem 11 may appear strong compared to existing
work on passive adversaries [4,13]. This seems unavoidablewhenwe allow frames to contain both encryption and decryption
symbols.
In the case where the two frames to be compared contain no decryption symbols, our proofs are easily adapted to work
when the encryption scheme is ω-IND-P1-C0 only, where ω-IND-P1-C0 is deﬁned similarly to ω-IND-P1-C1 except that the
adversary has no access to the decryption oracle. Such an assumption is realizable in practice using a variable-input-length
cipher [39,38].
Finally, it should be possible to recover the classical assumption IND-P1-C1 by modeling the ECB mode (Electronic Code
Book). Consider two new symbols enc : Data× Data → Data and dec : Data× Data → Data, and deﬁne the symbols encn and
decn (formally and concretely) recursively by
encn+1(x, y)=consn(enc(headn(x), y), encn(tailn(x), y)) and
decn+1(x, y)=consn(dec(headn(x), y), decn(tailn(x), y))
together with the equations
dec(enc(x, y), y)=x
enc(dec(x, y), y)=y
Deﬁne well-formed frames as those of which the normal forms contain no encryption cycles. Then, similar techniques can
be applied to show that ≈Esym-soundness holds for well-formed frames as soon as the implementations for enc and dec are
both IND-P1-C1, or equivalently [37], enc is SPRP.
Note on the well-formedness assumptions. We may also note that it is possible to slightly relax the assumptions of well-
formedness of frames. In particular we could allow encryption cycles on deducible keys and for instance allow the frame
{x = enc(k1, k2), y = enc(k2, k1), z = k1} which is currently discarded. As these extensions are not essential for our results
we prefer to avoid unnecessary clutter and keep the deﬁnitions simple.
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6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper we developed a general framework for relating formal and computational models of security protocols in
the presence of a passive attacker. These are the ﬁrst results on abstract models allowing arbitrary equational theories. We
deﬁne the soundness and faithfulness of cryptographic implementations with respect to abstract models. We also provide
a soundness criterion which is not only sufﬁcient but also necessary for many theories. Finally, we provide new soundness
results for the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.
A direction for further work is to study the soundness of other theories. An interesting case is the combination of the two
theories considered in this paper, that is modeling the exclusive OR, ciphers and lists. Another interesting open problem is to
generalize the notion of transparent frames so as to include probabilistic encryption, while retaining the essential properties
of transparent frames. Finally, an ambitious extension is to consider the case of an active attacker in presence of general
equational theories.
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Appendix
A. General results on static equivalence
We prove here some general properties of static equivalence concerning free symbols. We ﬁrst establish a useful interpo-
lation lemma.
Given a term U = f (U1, . . . ,Un) where f is a free symbol (see Section 2.1) and a name a of the same sort as U, the cutting
function cutU,a is deﬁned recursively as follows: cutU,a(u) = u if u is a variable or a name, and
cutU,a(g(T1, . . . , Tk)) =
{
a if g = f , k = n and ∀1 i  n, Ui =E Ti
g(cutU,a(T1), . . . , cutU,a(Tk)) otherwise
Thus, the effect of function cutU,a(T) is to substitute some (but not all) subterms of T equal to U modulo E with a.
Lemma 15. Let U = f (U1, . . . ,Un) be a term such that f is a free symbol. Let a be a name of the same sort as U. For any two terms
M and N,
M =E N implies cutU,a(M) =E cutU,a(N).
Proof. By Birkhoff’s theorem, M =E N means that there exist n 0 and M0, . . . , Mn such that M = M0 ↔E M1 ↔E Mn = N
where ↔E denotes one step of rewriting along one equation in (the generating set of) E, oriented in either direction.
To prove the property by induction on n, it sufﬁces to consider the case n = 1. More precisely, assume that there exists
an equation l = r in E, a position p and a substitution θ such thatM|p = lθ and N = M[rθ ]p. By deﬁnition of free symbols, we
may assume that f does not occur in l and r. We consider two cases depending on whether the cutting function cutU,a cuts a
subterm above p or not.
• Either there exists a proper preﬁx p′ of p such that M|p′ = f (T1, . . . , Tk) and for all i, Ui =E Ti. We consider the small-
est p′ that satisﬁes this property. Thus p = p′ · i · p′′ and N = M[f (T1, . . . , Ti[rθ ]p′′ , . . . , Tn)p′ ]. Both terms f (T1, . . . , Tk) and
f (T1, . . . , Ti[rθ ]p′′ , . . . , Tn) are substituted with a, thus cutU,a(M) = cutU,a(N).
• Or no such cutting position p′ is a proper preﬁx of p. This means that cutU,a(M[x]p) = cutU,a(N[x]p) and cutU,a(M) =
cutU,a(M[x]p)[cutU,a(lθ)]p, where x is a fresh variable. Moreover, cutU,a(lθ) = lcutU,a(θ) and cutU,a(rθ) = rcutU,a(θ) since
f is free. We deduce
cutU,a(M) = cutU,a(M[x]p)[cutU,a(lθ)]p
= cutU,a(N[x]p)[lcutU,a(θ)]p
=E cutU,a(N[x]p)[rcutU,a(θ)]p
= cutU,a(N)
Using this lemma, we establish two simple properties of free symbols.
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Corollary 16. Let f be a free symbol and f (T1, . . . , Tn) a term of a non-degenerated type τ.
1. For every U1, . . . ,Un of the appropriate sort,
f (T1, . . . , Tn) =E f (U1, . . . ,Un) iff ∀i, Ti =E Ui
2. Let U be a term of sort τ such that f does not appear in U. Then
f (T1, . . . , Tn) /=E U
Proof.
1. The right-to-left implication is trivial. Let T = f (T1, . . . , Tn) and U = f (U1, . . . ,Un). By contradiction, assume that there
exists an i such that Ti /=E Ui. Let a1, a2 be two fresh names of sort τ . We apply Lemma 15 on the equation T =E U
successively with cutT ,a1 and cutU ′ ,a2 where U
′ = cutT ,a1 (U) = f (cutT ,a1 (U1), . . . , cutT ,a1 (Un)). We obtain a1 =E a2, hence τ
is degenerated; contradiction.
2. Assume f (T1, . . . , Tn) =E U. Then by Lemma 15, since f does not occur in U, we obtain a =E U for some fresh name a,
hence τ is degenerated; contradiction. 
We are now ready to prove our propositions.
Proposition 17. Let T1, T2 be two terms of sort s such that T1 /=E T2. Assume a free symbol hs : s× Key → Hash such that the sort
Key is not degenerated. Consider the frame ϕ1 = {x1 = hs(T1, k), x2 = hs(T2, k)}where k is a fresh name. Let ϕ2 = {x1 = n, x2 = n′}
where n,n′ are two distinct fresh names of sort Hash. Then we have ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2.
Proof. LetM and N be two terms such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ) and names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅.
Assume Mϕ2 =E Nϕ2. Let θ be the substitution {n → hs(T1, k),n′ → hs(T2, k)}. Since the equational theory E is stable by
substitution of names, we haveMϕ2θ =E Nϕ2θ , hence,Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1 as n,n′ are fresh names.
Conversely, assumeMϕ1 =E Nϕ1. Let U1 = hs(T1, k). By Lemma 15, we have cutU1,n(Mϕ1) =E cutU1,n(Nϕ1). Since k does not
appear in M nor N, by Corollary 16, it holds that cutU1,n(Mϕ1) = McutU1,n(ϕ1) and cutU1,n(Nϕ1) = NcutU1,n(ϕ1). Now, using
T1 /=E T2, we prove cutU1,n(ϕ1) = {x1 = n, x2 = hs(T2, k)}. Indeed, we have cutU1,n(hs(T2, k)) = hs(cutU1,n(T2), k) since T1 /=E T2.
Besides, as k does not appear in T2, by Corollary 16,we have cutU1,n(T2) = T2. Similarly, by applying cutU2,n′ withU2 = hs(T2, k),
we obtain
McutU2,n′ (cutU1,n(ϕ1)) =E NcutU2,n′ (cutU1,n(ϕ1))
that is,Mϕ2 =E Nϕ2. 
Proposition 18. Let ϕ be a frame and T a term of sort s. Assume a free symbol hs : s× Key → Hash such that the sort Key is not
degenerated. Let ϕ1 = ϕ ∪ {x = hs(T , k), y = k} and ϕ2 = ϕ ∪ {x = n, y = k} where x, y are fresh variables, k is a fresh name of sort
Key,n is a fresh name of sort Hash. If ϕ E T , then ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2.
Proof. LetM andN be two terms such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ) andnames(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅.Weprove thatMϕ2 =E Nϕ2
impliesMϕ1 =E Nϕ1 similarly as for Proposition 17.
Conversely, assume Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1. Let U = hs(T , k). By Lemma 15, we have cutU,n(Mϕ1) =E cutU,n(Nϕ1). Let us prove that
cutU,n(Mϕ1) = McutU,n(ϕ1).
Indeed, otherwise, there exists a subterm M1 of M such that M1 is not a variable and M1ϕ1 = hs(T ′, T ′′) with T ′ =E T and
T ′′ =E k. SinceM1 is not a variable,M1 is of the formM1 = hs(M′1,M′′1)withM′1ϕ1 = T ′ =E T , which implies that T is deducible;
contradiction.
We deduce that cutU,n(Mϕ1) = McutU,n(ϕ1), and similarly cutU,n(Nϕ1) = NcutU,n(ϕ1). ThusMcutU,n(ϕ1) =E NcutU,n(ϕ1). By
Corollary 16, as k does not appear in ϕ, we have that cutU,n(ϕ) = ϕ, hence cutU,n(ϕ1) = ϕ2 andMϕ2 =E Nϕ2. 
Proposition 19. Let T1, T2 be two terms of sort s such that T1 =E T2. Assume a free symbol hs : s× Key → Hash such that Key is
not degenerated. Let ϕ = {x1 = hs(T1, k), x2 = hs(T2, k)}. Then, ϕ ≈E {x1 = n, x2 = n} where n is a fresh name of sort Hash.
Proof. LetM andN be two terms such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ) andnames(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅.Weprove thatMϕ2 =E Nϕ2
impliesMϕ1 =E Nϕ1 similarly as for Proposition 17.
Conversely, assume Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1. Let U = hs(T1, k). By Lemma 15, we have cutU,n(Mϕ1) =E cutU,n(Nϕ1). Since k does not
appear in M nor N, by Corollary 16, we have cutU,n(Mϕ1) = McutU,n(ϕ1) and cutU,n(Nϕ1) = NcutU,n(ϕ1). Now, since T1 =E T2,
we obtain cutU,n(ϕ1) = {x1 = n, x2 = n} = ϕ2. Thus we haveMϕ2 =E Nϕ2. 
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B. Static equivalence in groups
We establish some properties of static equivalence in the equational theory of abelian groups EG deﬁned in Section 3.2.
For this purpose we characterize equivalence classes in EG by a representation lemma.
LetXA (XG andXHash, respectively) be the set of variables of sort A (G and Hash, respectively). LetNA (NG andNHash,
respectively) be the set of names of sort A (G and Hash, respectively). Let AC be the equational theory corresponding to the
subset of equations from EG, modeling the associativity and commutativity of the three operators ·, + and ∗.
We call unitary monomial of sort A a function β :XA ∪NA → N almost everywhere zero, i.e. except for a ﬁnite number
of entries. Such a function β can be considered as a term of sort A (modulo AC):
β =AC
∏
a∈NA , β(a) /=0
aβ(a) ·
∏
u∈XA , β(u) /=0
uβ(u)
where empty products are considered to be the term 1A, and a
β(a) (β(a) /= 0) denotes the term a · . . . · a︸ ︷︷ ︸
β(a) times
. We denoteMA the
set of all unitary monomials of sort A.
A canonical form of sort A is a function α :MA → Z almost everywhere zero. We consider such a function α as a term of
sort A (modulo AC):
α =AC
∑
β∈MA , α(β) /=0
α(β) · β
where empty sums are considered to be the term 0A, and integers are naturally represented as 0A, 1A + · · · + 1A or −(1A +
· · · + 1A) of sort A.
A canonical form of sort G is a function γ , mapping terms inXN ∪NN to canonical forms of sort A, almost everywhere
zero, i.e. the function evaluates to the constant 0 except for a ﬁnite number of entries. We consider a canonical form γ to be
a term of sort G (modulo AC):
γ =AC
∏
g∈NG , γ (g) /=0
gγ (g) ∗
∏
x∈XG , γ (x) /=0
xγ (x)
where empty products are considered to be equal to 1G .
A canonical formof sort Hash, denoted ι, is either a variable of sortHash : ι = z ∈XHash, a nameof sortHash : ι = h ∈NHash
or a canonical form γ of sort G considered to be a term ι = h(γ ).
Lemma 20. For any term T of sort A (G,Hash, respectively), there exists a unique canonical form αT (γT , ιT , respectively) such that
T =EG αT
(T =EG γT , T =EG ιT , respectively).
Proof (Sketch).We show the existence of a canonical form of a term T by induction on the structure of T . For instance, given
T = T1∗T2, and two canonical forms αT1 and αT2 , we obtain the canonical form of T by rearranging the product αT1∗αT2 modulo
EG (and if necessary the induction hypthesis is also used on the exponents). To show the uniqueness of the normal form, it is
sufﬁcient to show that whenever two canonical terms are equal as terms modulo EG, they are also equal “mathematically”.
Formally this is established by studying the AC normal form of each canonical form with respect to the following AC-
convergent rewriting system.
u+ 0A → u
u+ (−u) → 0A
u · 1A → u
(u+ v) ·w → u ·w + v ·w
u · 0A → 0A
−(u+ v) → (−u) + (−v)
(−u) · v → −(u · v)
−(−u) → u
−0A → 0A
x ∗1G → x
(xu)v → x(u·v)
xu ∗ xv → xu+v
x1A → x
x0A → 1G
(x ∗ y)u → xu ∗ yu
x ∗ x → x(1A+1A)
x ∗ xu → xu+1A
(1G)
u → 1G
This rewriting system has been obtained by orienting and completing the equations generating EG, except AC, using the
tool Cime [40]. 
Proposition 21. Let ϕ1 = νg, a, b.{x1 = g, x2 = ga, x3 = gb, x4 = ga·b} and ϕ2 = νg, a, b, c.{x1 = g, x2 = ga, x3 = gb, x4 = gc}. We
have that ϕ1 ≈EG ϕ2.
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Proof. LetM,N be two terms of the same sort such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ1) and names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ1,ϕ2) = ∅.
AssumeMϕ2 =EG Nϕ2. Let θ be the substitution {c → a · b}. Since the equational theory E is stable by substitution of names,
we haveMϕ2θ =E Nϕ2θ , that is,Mϕ1 =EG Nϕ1 since c ∈ names(M,N).
Conversely, assumeMϕ1 =EG Nϕ1. IfM and N are of sort A, then var(M,N) = ∅ and henceMϕ2 = Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1 = Nϕ2.
Otherwise,M and N are of sort G. AsMϕ1 =EG Nϕ1 is equivalent toMϕ1∗(Nϕ1)−1A = 1G , we suppose that N = 1G .
As var(M) ⊆ dom(ϕ1) and names(M) ∩ names(ϕ1,ϕ2) = ∅, the canonical form γ ofM is of the form
M =EG
∏
g′ /=g
g′γ (g
′) ∗ xγ (x1)
1
∗ . . . ∗xγ (x4)
4
where γ (g′) and γ (xi) represent closed terms with disjoint names {a, b, c}. Hence, we have that
Mϕ1 =EG
∏
g′ /=g
g′γ (g
′) ∗ gγ (x1)+ γ (x2)·a+ γ (x3)·b+ γ (x4)a·b =EG 1G
and we conclude that for any i, γ (xi) = 0A and for any g′, γ (g′) = 0A, i.e. M = 1G . 
Proposition 22. Let the frame ϕ1 = νg, a.{x1 = ga, x2 = a, x3 = h(g)} and the frame ϕ2 = νg, a,h.{x1 = ga, x2 = a, x3 = h}. We
have that ϕ1 ≈EG ϕ2.
Proof. LetM,N be two terms such that var(M,N) ⊆ dom(ϕ1) and names(M,N) ∩ names(ϕ1,ϕ2) = ∅.
AssumeMϕ2 =E Nϕ2. Let θ be the substitution {h → h(g)}. Since the equational theory E is stable by substitution of names,
we haveMϕ2θ =E Nϕ2θ , hence, as h ∈ names(M,N),Mϕ1 =E Nϕ1.
Conversely, assume that Mϕ1 =EG Nϕ1. If M and N are of sort A or G, then var(M,N) ⊆ {x1, x2} and hence Mϕ2 = Mϕ1 =E
Nϕ1 = Nϕ2.
Otherwise, M and N are of sort Hash. We suppose that M = x3 and N = h(N′) where var(N′) ⊆ {x1, x2} (other cases are
trivial). As h is a free symbol, by Corollary 16,Mϕ1 =EG Nϕ1 is equivalent to N′ϕ1 =EG g.
Given that var(N′) ⊆ {x1, x2} and names(N′) ∩ names(ϕ1,ϕ2) = ∅, the canonical form γ of N′ is of the form
N′ =EG
∏
g′ /=g
g′γ (g
′) ∗ xγ (x1)
1
where γ (g′) and γ (x1) are terms that have no variable other than x2 and do not contain a. Hence we have
N′ϕ1 =EG
∏
g′ /=g
g′γ (g
′){x2 →a} ∗ gγ (x1)·a
which contradicts N′ϕ1 =EG g. 
C. Static equivalence in ciphers and lists
Before proving Lemma 10, we ﬁrst introduce a handy lemma to characterize deducible terms.
Lemma 23. Let ϕ = νn˜.σ be a closed frame inR-normal form and T a term inR-normal form. If ϕ Esym T then T = C[T1, . . . , Tk]
where the Ti are deducible subterms of ϕ and C is a context that does not contain private names that is names(C) ∩ n˜ = ∅.
Proof. By deﬁnition, ϕ Esym T if and only if there exists a termM such that names(M) ∩ names(ϕ) = ∅ andMϕ =Esym T , that
is,Mϕ →∗R T . We prove Lemma 23 by induction on the size ofM. The base caseM = xi is trivial.
If M = f (M1, . . . ,Mk). We only consider the case where M = dec(M1,M2) since the other cases are similar. We have
M1 →∗R T1 and M2 →∗R T2. By applying the induction hypothesis to M1 and M2, we obtain that T1 = C1[T ′1, . . . , T ′k] and T2 =
C2[T ′1, . . . , T ′k] where the T ′i are deducible subterms of ϕ and C1,C2 are contexts that do not contain names. We haveMϕ →∗R
dec(T1, T2). Either dec(T1, T2) is in R-normal form. In that case and by convergence of R, we have T = dec(T1, T2), hence
the result. Or dec(T1, T2) is not in R-normal form. By convergence, we have dec(T1, T2) →R T . Since T1 and T2 are already
in normal form, we must have T1 = enc(T ′1, T2) and T = T ′1. Either C1 = enc(C ′1,C ′′1) and we have T = C ′1[T ′1, . . . , T ′k]. Or C1 = _,
which means that T1 is a deducible subterm of ϕ. We deduce that T is a deducible subterm of ϕ, hence the result. 
We can now start the proof of Lemma 10.
Proof. In what follows, we say that a term or a context is public if it does not contain the names occurring in ϕ. Since
ϕ = ϕ′{n → T} and Esym is stable by substitutions of names, we have eqEsym (ϕ′) ⊆ eqEsym (ϕ). To prove eqEsym (ϕ) ⊆ eqEsym (ϕ′),
we introduce the following lemma. We set θ to be {n → T}. Let n1, . . . ,np be the names occurring in ϕ′.
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Lemma 24. Let C1 be a context such that we have ϕ
′ Esym C1[n1, . . . ,np] and C1[n1, . . . ,np]θ →R T . Then there exists a public
context C2 such that C1 →R C2 and T = C2[n1, . . . ,np]θ.
The lemmaisprovedby inspectionof the rulesofR. The reductionoccursat somepositionp: the reductionC1[n1, . . . ,np]|pθ →R
T occurs in head. Let C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] = C1[n1, . . . ,np]|p If C ′1 is itself an instance of the left-hand-side of a rule ofR, than we
clearly have that C ′
1
→R C ′2 such that T = C2[n1, . . . ,np]θ , where C2 is obtained from C1 by replacing C ′1 with C ′2 at position
p. If C ′
1
is not an instance of the left-hand-side of a rule ofR and since T is already inR-normal form, there are only four
possibilities for C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np].
• C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] = enc(ni,C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np]). It must be the case that ni = n, T is of the form dec(U,V) and V = C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np].
FromLemma23andsinceϕ′ Esym C1[n1, . . . ,np], eitherC ′1[n1, . . . ,np] is subtermofϕ′ orni andC ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np]arededucible.
In both cases, we obtain a contradiction. Indeed, if C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] is subterm of ϕ′ then C ′1[n1, . . . ,np]θ = enc(dec(U,V),nj)
is a subterm of ϕ, which contradicts that ϕ is in normal form. If ni and C
′′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] are deducible then this contradicts
ϕ Esym V .
• C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] = dec(ni,nj). This case is very similar to the previous one.
• C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] = cons(ni,C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np]). It must be the case that ni = n, T is of the form head(V) and C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np] =
tail(V). From Lemma 23 and since ϕ′ Esym C1[n1, . . . ,np], either C ′1[n1, . . . ,np] is subterm of ϕ′ or ni and C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np] are
deducible. As previously, in both cases, we obtain a contradiction. if C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] is subterm of ϕ′ then C ′1[n1, . . . ,np]θ =
cons(head(V), tail(V)) is a subterm of ϕ, which contradicts that ϕ is in normal form. If ni and C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np] are deducible
then both n and tail(V) are deducible in ϕ′, whichmeans that both head(V) and tail(v) are deducible in ϕ, thusV is deducible
in ϕ, contradiction.
• C ′
1
[n1, . . . ,np] = cons(C ′′1 [n1, . . . ,np],ni). This case is very similar to the previous one.
Now, let (M = N) ∈ eqEsym (ϕ) and let us show that (M = N) ∈ eqEsym (ϕ′).We haveMϕ =Esym Nϕ, that is,Mϕ′θ =Esym Nϕ′θ . By
convergence ofR, there exists a term T such thatMϕ′θ →∗R T and Nϕ′θ →∗R T . By applying repeatedly Lemma 24, we obtain
that Mϕ′ →∗R T1 such that T = T1θ and Nϕ′ →∗R T2 such that T = T2θ . Assume that we have proved that T1 = T2. Then we
haveMϕ′ =Esym Nϕ′, that is, (M = N) ∈ eqEsym (ϕ′), which concludes the proof. It remains for us to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 25. Let T1 and T2 be two terms such that each Ti is either deducible from ϕ
′, that is, ϕ′ Esym Ti, or Ti is a subterm of ϕ′.
Then T1θ = T2θ implies T1 = T2.
The lemma is proved by induction on the sum of the size of T1 and T2. First notice that, by Lemma 23, any subterm T
′ of one
of the Ti veriﬁes that T
′ is deducible from ϕ′ or T ′ is a subterm of ϕ′.
• The base case is trivial.
• If none of T1 or T2 is n: T1 = f (T ′1, . . . , T ′k) and T2 = f (T ′′1 , . . . , T ′′k ). We must have T ′i θ = T ′′i θ for every 1 i  k. By applying
the induction hypothesis, we obtain T ′
i
= T ′′
i
thus T1 = T2.
• Themost difﬁcult case is when T1 = n and T2 = f (T ′1, . . . , T ′k). We ﬁrst notice that since nθ = f (T ′1, . . . , T ′k)θ , n cannot occur
in T2, thus T2 = T2θ . Either T2 is a subterm of ϕ′, which is impossible by construction of ϕ′ or T2 deducible. Since T2 is not
a subterm of ϕ′ and applying again Lemma 23, we get that the immediate subterms of T2 are deducible in ϕ′ (thus in ϕ),
which contradicts the choice of T . 
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